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1.  Introduction  
Nowadays the public debt problem is one of the most discussed topics in Italy. Every day the media discuss 
crisis, spread, public debt, and so on. 
Our thesis is divided into two main parts. 
In  the  first  part,  after  defining  what  public  debt  is,  the  relevant  institutions  and  the  guidelines  that 
countries should follow in order to correctly manage public debt are set out. 
In the first part of this paper, we want also to make clear when this public debt has emerged and why this is 
a big problem in Italy. For this reason there is an account of the history of the Italian public debt starting 
from when Italy became a unified country, right up to today. This helps us understand how Italy has 
managed its public debt during various economic periods.  
In the second part an econometric analysis is developed, with the objective of creating an econometric 
model aimed at explaining the public debt / GDP ratio over time for the main developed countries.  
Econometric modelling derives from the economic theory which suggests a list of variables pertinent to the 
problem to be faced. In our case, the main studies carried out on public debt or on the public debt/GDP 
ratio are revised. These studies lead us to choose a list of the variables that seem to have an impact on 
public debt.  
As it is our intention to create a model showing the development of the Italian public debt, a list of 
countries  having  similar  economic  characteristics  to  Italy  is  therefore  chosen.  In  order  to  select  the 
appropriate countries, we make use of how the World Bank separated nations into the high income or the 
low income category. Italy is one of the high income countries and so the data regarding a total of 19 
countries is used.  
Besides  the  specification  of  the  variables  and  the  list  of  countries  concerned,  other  hypotheses  are 
necessary, such as the specification of the model and a possible transformation of the chosen variables. 
The relationship is obviously stochastic due to the presence of an error term in the function, containing any 
omitted effects making the relationship presumed by the theory inexact. Moreover, the use of panel data 
allows us to obtain more efficient estimation by taking into account the correlation between unobserved 
and observed individual effects.  
Once  the  list  of  pertinent  variables  and  the  specification  of  the  econometric  model  to  be  created  is 
identified, a check is made to see whether other works similar to our idea have already been published.  
One article has made a similar analysis to ours and our first idea is to create an identical dataset. However, 
further to careful sensitivity analysis, a shorter period of time than the one used by the author of that 
article is thus chosen to be analysed.   
We attempt to make a balanced dataset with real data. In order to obtain that, we check a lot of websites 
which contain economic data such as the World Bank, Eurostat, oecd, the International Monetary Fund and 
so on. We observe that the oecd database contains almost all the values we need. Thus, we decide to make 
a dataset using the data from the oecd website as the main source, integrating it with values from other 
websites. To be precise, we integrate the missing values with the dataset from the World Bank and Eurostat 2 
 
because their values are mutually consistent in certain cases. For the population variables we use the 
values from the World Bank website.  
Before creating the model, we make a careful sensitivity analysis, so as to understand how the results 
change with the inclusion of one country as opposed to another one, or with a different range time. 
A preliminary analysis is also added to the article by Sinha et al. (2011), in order to realize whether using 
panel data makes sense. In this analysis we specify how each variable is measured, its relationship to the 
public debt / GDP ratio and the hypotheses we expect from the variables. 
The next step is to estimate the models by using Pooled OLS Fixed effects and random effects models. 
Another aim of our analysis is to check whether there are important differences between the various 
estimation methods used, and also focus on the differences in the results obtained from simple regressions 
and multiple regressions.  
At the end of this thesis a summary of the main results is made and how these results change according to 
the type of estimation method, range time and countries considered.  
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2.  Public debt: definition 
Public debt, also known as Government debt or national debt, is the debt of a state against other subjects 
(foreign states, people, banks, companies) who signed a credit to the state. When the public expenditure of 
one state is greater than its revenue, it must cover the deficit by the issuing of financial obligations. Public 
debt is created when the necessary resources for the socio-economic development of a state are greater 
than the opportunities that exist at that time. 
The value in money of the public debt is often  considered according to the duration  period by when 
repayment is due: short term is used for repayments due within  one year and long term for those that are 
due in more than ten years.  
The debit owed to foreign lenders is called external debt, while the debt owed to lenders within the 
country  is  called  internal  debt.  External  borrowing  allows  to    increase  the  country’s  resources  while 
domestic borrowing just transfers resources within the country. External borrowing is usually associated 
with vulnerabilities that may lead to debt crises because central banks cannot print the hard currency 
necessary to repay external debt. And this is the motivation of why most of the analysis of public debt has 
traditionally focused on external debt.   
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3.  Public debt management 
3.a  Bank for international settlements 
Public  debt  are  often  set  by  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements  which  is  an  intergovernmental 
organization of central banks. It is “a bank for central banks”. It is based in Basel (Switzerland) and has 58 
members from the central banks.  Nowadays, central banks in 30 countries report their aggregate national 
consolidated data to the BIS, which uses them as basis for calculating and publishing global data. The main 
goals of BIS are two: regulating capital adequacy and making reserve requirements transparent. 
In the website of the BIS, it is possible to find the banking services for the central banks of each country. 
“The BIS offers a wide range of financial services specifically designed to assist central banks and other 
official monetary institutions in the management of their foreign exchange reserves. Some 140 customers, 
including various international financial institutions, currently make use of these services and on average, 
over the last few years, some 4% of global foreign exchange reserves have been invested by central banks 
with the BIS. BIS financial services are provided out of two linked trading rooms: one at its Basel head office 
and one at its office in Hong Kong SAR.” 
“The BIS continually adapts its product range in order to more effectively respond to the evolving needs of 
the central banks. Beside standard services such as sight/notice accounts and fixed-term deposits, the BIS 
has developed a range of more sophisticated financial products which central banks can actively trade with 
the BIS to increase the return on their foreign assets. The BIS also transacts foreign exchange and gold on 
behalf of its customers. 
In addition, the BIS offers a range of asset management services in sovereign securities or high-grade 
assets. These may be either a specific portfolio mandate negotiated between the BIS and a central bank, or 
an open-end fund structure - the BIS Investment Pool (BISIP) - allowing customers to invest in a common 
pool of assets. The two Asian Bond Funds (ABF1 and ABF2) are administered by the BIS under the BISIP 
umbrella: ABF1 is managed by the BIS and ABF2 by a group of external fund managers.” 
“The BIS also extends short-term credits to central banks, usually on a collateralised basis. From time to 
time,  the  BIS  also  coordinates  emergency  short-term  lending  to  countries  in  financial  crisis.  In  these 
circumstances, the BIS advances funds on behalf of, and with the backing and guarantee of, a group of 
supporting central banks.” 
“The BIS's Statutes does not allow the BIS to open current accounts in the name of, or make advances to, 
governments. The BIS does not accept deposits from, or generally provides financial services to, private 
individuals or corporate entities.” 
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3.b  Guidelines for public debt management 
The public debt/GDP ratio is the most important indicator of the health of an economy. It is calculated as a 
country’s total debt amount as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  With a low ratio the 
economy probably produces a large number of goods and services which allow the government to pay back 
debts.  
From the manual proposed by International Monetary Fund (2003) it is possible to extract the following 
information.  
Public debt management is the process for managing the government’s debt and pursue any other public 
debt management objectives. The main goal for the governments should be to ensure that the rate level 
and growth level in their public debt are sustainable over the time. A good strategy has also to reduce the 
country’s vulnerability to domestic and international financial shocks. 
Every  government  has  to  make  policy  choices  about  debt  management  objectives,  focusing  on  risk 
tolerance, how to manage their liabilities, and so on. All the governments aim for low debt-GDP ratio. 
Obviously a government with high public debt has bond interest rates higher than other with public debt 
smaller.  
The actual possibility for the governments to accumulate a huge debt usually causes a set of wrong politics. 
Since the benefit of a high public expenditure has effect in short term, the government prefers to have high 
public expenditure in order to be viewed positively by the population. By doing so, the next government 
has to repay the previous debt with strong action ( i.e. increase of tax burden ), and it is viewed as a 
negative government by the population. 
Another  problem  for  a  country  with  high  public  debt  is  the  international  view.  The  foreign  investors 
consider the public debt as a measurement of stability of a country economy. For this reason, a country 
with high public debt cannot respond well to an eventual financial crisis as a country with a smaller debt. 
When the public debt is too big, the indebted country can lose its autonomy. If the creditor is a foreign 
state and the indebt government cannot cover its debt, the creditor will have strong consequences in the 
economy of indebted country. An example is the government of Nauru. Nauru was heavily in debt to 
Australia  and  its  government  could  not  cover  its  debt.  The  consequence  of  that  situation  was  the 
bankruptcy of Nauru and Australia imposed its currency. Similar cases happened in Iceland. In this country 
the exchange of currency did not happen, but after the bailout by Russia and by the International Monetary 
Fund, Iceland could not have the same financial autonomy. 
Because  of  the  importance  of  public  debt  management  in  the  countries,  International  Monetary  and 
Financial Committee requested the staff from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to create a 
set of guidelines for public debt management. The purpose of this work is to assist countries in order to 
cope with economic and financial shocks. Government debt managers from 30 countries, in July 2000, 
provided  an  initial  draft  that  was  discussed  by  the  IMF  and  World  Bank.  At  the  end,  more  than  300 
representatives from 122 countries participated to outreach the guidelines. The final version was approved 
in March 2001. The guidelines focused on principles applicable to a board range of countries and with 
various institutional structures of national debt management.  7 
 
As mentioned before the main objective of public debt management is to ensure that the government’s 
financing needs and its obligation payments, are met at the lowest possible cost over the medium and long 
runs and have a low degree of risk. To achieve these goals it is necessary that debt managers, fiscal policy 
advisers and central bankers share their objectives. They should have the interdependencies between their 
different  policy  instruments.  Debt  management,  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities  should  also  share 
information about the government’s current and future liquidity needs.  
The guidelines state the need of clear roles and clear objectives of the financial agency responsible for debt 
management. It highlights that the goals should be clearly defined and publicly disclosed. It also states that 
measures of cost and risk that are adopted by a country should be explained. According to the guidelines, 
the  people  must  be  informed  on  the  past,  current  and  projected  budgetary  activity  by  publishing 
information  of  its  debt  and  of  the  stocks  (currency,  maturity  and  interest  rate  structure).  The  risk  of 
government losses from inadequate operations must be supported by a management information system 
with proper safeguards. An important point states that the staff involved in debt management should be 
subject  to  code  of  conduct  and  to  conflict  of  interest  guidelines  regarding  the  management  of  their 
personal financial affairs.  
By following the guidelines, a framework should be draft to enable the identification and management of 
the trade-offs between expected costs and risks in the government debt portfolio. In order to address the, 
it should conduct tests of the debt portfolio on the basis of the economic and financial shocks which the 
government is potentially exposed. Debt managers have to consider the impact on liquidity if they issue 
new borrowings. To ensure an efficient market for government securities, the government should achieve a 
broad investor base for its obligations. It is necessary that debt management operations in the primary 
market are transparent and predictable. Finally, the governments and central banks should try to make 
resilient secondary markets in order for it to be efficient in different market conditions.  
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4.  Government bonds 
4.a  Definition of government bonds  
Government bonds are bonds issued by a government to cover the deficit accumulated on the finance 
period. Those bonds are traditionally regarded as risk-free bonds, because every country can print more 
money to be able to redeem the bond at maturity. In most of the countries, it is forbidden to print money 
just to pay the bonds at the maturity. However, also in these countries the bonds are regarded as risk-free 
because the central banks may buy government bonds in order to ensure the debt monetizing. Despite this, 
some risks exist such as currency risk for foreign investors and inflation risk. Currency risk arises when 
investors have bonds in a currency which is declining against most of the other currencies. Inflation risk, 
instead arises when the inflation rate is higher than expected at maturity time. Areal example is what 
happened in the Weimar Germany of the 1920s when the government’s inability to pay the national debt 
derived from the costs of the World War I, causing a hyperinflation. This fact causes a less purchasing 
power than expected and for this reason most governments issue inflation indexed bonds, that protect 
investors against this type of risk. 
The bond interest rates are different from country to country because they reflect the economic situation 
of each country. A country with a very bad financial situation has to issue the bond with a higher interest 
rate  than  a  country  with  more  stable  economy  in  order  to  attract  investors.  A  clear  example  is  the 
difference between the Italian bond interest rates and German bonds interest rates. This difference is 
called spread Btp Bund. 
4.b  Current kinds of bond in Italy 
The Italian government uses five main types of bonds, which can be found on the Banca d’Italia website: 
BOT, CTZ, CCT/CCT EU, BTP, BTP€I . (information at www.dt.tesoro.it) 
  BTP€I, Buoni  (BTP indexed to Italian inflation). It is a government bond which allows to have a 
protection against an increase in the Italian level of price. Both the coupons and the principal are 
revalued with the inflation rate. As inflation rate Italian government uses the rate measured by 
Istat. Every six month the government repaid the holder of these BTP for an amount equal to the 
loss  of  purchasing  of  power.  By  this  action  the  investors  have  a  minimum  yield  guaranteed 
constant. If the price index have some adjustment after the first publication, the calculations of 
amount to repaid the investor will be still the first index published.  
 
  BOT ( Treasury Bills). They are short term securities, the longest maturity of these bills is one year. 
The remuneration, determined entirely by the discount at issue, is consider anticipated for fiscal 
purpose. This fact because the tax for retail investors is applied at time subscription. The auctions, 
since April 2009, are expressed in yield term and not in price. The different maturities are three, six 
or twelve months. The remuneration will be at the maturity time, and in one time. The BOTs are 
zero coupon, so they are easy to manage, because  the expenditure for this kind of bills are lesser 
than the nomination redemption value. These BOTs could be purchase for a minimum value of 
1000€ or for multiple of this amount. The auctions to buy these bounds are competitive auction 
where the investor offers are in yield term.  
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  CTZ (Zero Coupon Treasury bonds). It is bond with maturity of 24 months at the issue time, but 
then this maturity can be changed. The remuneration are equal to the difference between nominal 
value and the price paid. They are zero coupon and so they are so easy to ménage for the same 
reason of BOTs. The CTZ could be buy for a minimum nominal value of 1000€ or multiple of this 
amount. The issue take place through a marginal auction with discretional determination of the 
allocation  price  and  of  the  quantity  issued.  There  is  a  mechanism  to  exclude  the  speculative 
request. The responsible for the sales of these bills are the Banca d’Italia. 
 
  CCT (Treasury Certificates). It is bond with floating rate, with 7 years of maturity. The interest are 
paid  with  deferred  coupons  indexed  to  6-month  BOTs  yield.  The  auction  has  the  same 
characteristics of the CTZ auctions. These auction are once per month. The CCTs allows, if investors 
want to have the remuneration before the maturity date, to have a principal as well as the initial 
amount. These bonds could be purchase for a minimum nominal value of 1000€ or multiple of this 
amount. From March 1991 the CCTs have 7 year maturity. 
 
  CCTeu  (Treasury Certificates linked to 6-month Euribor). It is bond with floating rate, usually with 5 
years maturity. The interest rate are indexed 6-month Euribor. On the remuneration impact also 
the different between the nominal value at the repayment date and the price to buy it at the issue 
date. The auctions have the same characteristics of  CCT and CTZ.  They are issue in auctions once 
every three month. Being bills index with a floating rate, they allows to have a remuneration in line 
with market yields. The coupons are paid every 6 month. 
 
  BTP ( Treasury Bond). It is a medium/long term bond, with a fix coupon paid every six month. They 
can be with three, five, ten, fifteen or thirty years maturity. The auction mechanism has the same 
characteristic of CTZ and CCT. These auction are twice per month. This kind of bills allows to have a 
regularity liquidity during the years. The minimum nominal value to buy a BTP is 1000€.  
 
  BTP€is (Treasury Bonds Linked to Euro-zone Inflation). It is a bond which allows to investors a 
protection against the price increase. Both the principal and the coupons are paid once every six 
month in line with the Euro area inflation rate.  The inflation rate are took by the Harmonised Index 
of Monthly prices (HICP). These index are took by Eurostat, and if this index will be changed, the 
remuneration will be still calculated with the first index published. If during the life of these bills 
there will be a price decries, the minimum amount repaid will be never smaller than the nominal 
value. It is also possible to have the remuneration before the maturity date. The amount in this 
case will be equal to the value of principal amount multiplied by the index coefficient. Usually they 
have five, ten, fifteen or thirty years maturity. The auctions are the same characteristic of  CCTs and 
there are once every month. These bond guarantee a constant interest in nominal terms.  
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5.   History of public debt in Italy  
Public debt in Italy is not a recent phenomenon, but has existed since the beginning of Italian history. 
Several articles were consulted to enable me to summarize the history of the Italian public debt up to 1980. 
One of these articles was written by Toniolo (2011), another one by members of the IMF staff (2003) , a 
third one by members of the Treasury (1988) and lastly one by Francesa (2008). Here below the main 
phases are reported. 
After the unification of the Italian peninsula on 17/3/1861, the Gran Libro del Debito Pubblico italiano 
(large book of Italian public debt) was instituted and on 4/08/1861, with the law for the Italian public debt  
unification, all debts from pre-unitary states were written inside this book. The amount was about 2400 
million lire : 
  Sardinian states: 1300 million 
  Lombardy: 150 million 
  Parma: 12 million 
  Modena: 18 million 
  Romagna: 19 million 
  Marche: 5 million 
  Umbria: 7 million 
  Tuscany: 140 million 
  Naples: 520 million 
  Sicily: 210 million 
In the first ten years the public debt increased from 45% to 95% of the GDP
1. The main reasons for this 
were structural budget deficits, extraordinary defence spending on the Third War of Independence (1866) 
and the engagement of the annexed debts of all regions.  
The first loan
2 of 500 million Lire was placed in the market by the Minister 
of Finance, Pietro Bastogi, in July 1861 to cover the deficit achieved in 
1861 and to cover the expected debt for 1862. 
In 1862, Quintino Sella replaced Bastogi in the position of Minister of 
Finance, but the result of his policy was catastrophic in the short-term. 
In the following years, Sella was replaced by Marco Minghetti, who had to 
take another loan of  700 million Lire. He also increased the movement of 
Treasury Bonds, which amounted to 227,5 million Lire.  
In 1864, Sella was reinstated as Minister of Finance and he tried to find 
                                                           
1 GDP (gross domestic product): the monetary value of all the goods and services produced by an economy 
over a specific period. It is measured in three ways on the basis of: 1) expenditure; 2) income; 3) the value 
added by industry.  
 
2 Loan: money lent under the condition that it will be repaid, either in instalments or all at once, at agreed 
dates. Usually the borrower pays the lender an agreed rate of interest.  
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alternative solutions which would be less onerous than a normal loan. He made an agreement with an 
Anonymous Society responsible for selling state properties that it would act as the State’s representative in 
the selling procedure in order to obtain money in less time. That convention was approved on 20/11/1864, 
with this action the decrease of public debt quotations stopped.  
Tax on income from movable wealth was also introduced in 1864 and the property tax was revised. 
1865 was the year of a new loan of 425 million Lire, the sale of railways for 185 million Lire and the 
balanced  budget  net  of  interest.  It  was  just  temporarily  balanced,  as  in  fact  the  following  year  an 
international financial crisis caused a decrease in the value of Italian rates abroad, from 66 Lire in March to 
49 Lire in April. 
It was also the time when tax on grain and on income from public debt stock was introduced. On 10
th 
March 1867 a determinant decree for the history of the Italian economy was issued. This ordinance forced 
the National Bank to give a loan to the Treasury of 250 million Lire with an interest rate of 1.5%. The forced 
circulation of all banknotes
3 was imposed.  
Before this action the only alternative for the placement of loans had been the sale of state property, but 
now printing money as a solution to cover the deficit had become possible.  
On 28
th July 1866 a loan which become a great success was placed in Italy. The cause of that success was 
the strong patriotic spirit which Italian people had felt since June when the war against Austria had broken 
out. 
In 1867 the Rattazzi law was adopted (15/08/1867) and bonds of 500 million Lire were issued. Those 
obligations
4 were not a great success. In the same period of time, the government had been searching for a 
way to collect money on the sale of tobacco. In 1868, Cambray-Digny created a society which had to 
monitor such sales. That company gave the Treasury 180 million Lire in gold and a specific annual rent and, 
in exchange, the state gave it the monopoly on tobacco for 15 years. 
During 1869 neither new loans nor laws were introduced.  
In 1870, Sella, who had returned to the position of Minister of Finance, needed to find a remedy for the 
residual deficit. He required 200 million Lire, so he signed an agreement with the National Bank according 
to which he received 122 million Lire. The total loan taken from the National Bank amounted to 500 million 
Lire. Sella deleted all unsold bonds, issued new obligations repayable only with the purchase of church 
property and also asked for a new normal loan of 80 million Lire. 
 
 
                                                           
3 Forced currency: FIAT money. Money is not supported by a specific reserve, but is decreed to be legal 
tender in payment of all debts and forced into circulation.  
4 Obligation: the duty of a borrower to repay a loan and that of the lender to ensure that the repayment is 
made; it can be a bond or another promise to pay a sum of money.  13 
 
Because of military expenditure and not wanting to skimp on public works, cuts on public spending had 
never been applied. Adding to that, the assumption of the last adjoining regions (Veneto in 1868 and the 
Papal State in 1871), the payment to Austria for war indemnity and the buyback
5 of railways from Alta 
Italia, the debt continued to increase.  
The implicit deflator of the GDP in the first ten years of Italian history increased by about 10% but grew to 
23% in the years  1872 and 1873. The capital market was monopolized by government bonds, there was no 
place for private titles.  
In 1871 there was a new operation for 150 million Lire. The credit transactions with the National Bank had 
become so large.  As result of this, the National bank was only the guarantor
6 of bonds. In this way, the 
State  had  a  new  income  issuance:  it  paid interest  regularly, which was  returned  in  cash,  only  shelling 
out 0.60% for it. 
In April 1872 there was a new contract with that Bank. The contract had three main points. The first one 
was the concession of a new loan of 300 million Lire with the interest rate reduced to 0.5%. The second 
main point was the conversion of the callable bonds
7 of 1866 into a consolidated 5%. This conversion was 
assigned to the National Bank; this process led to a saving of 217 million Lire for the Treasury. The third 
point was the subsistence of the amount of ecclesiastical bonds deleted, which returned to the bank by 
means of the operation of a loan to the Treasury, for which the bank was guarantor. 
In the next 40 years, through two institutional interventions, the 
public debt saw a positive period due to the positive trend of the 
economy and there was an interest rate reduction on bonds.  
The first action was the creation of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Postal 
Savings Banks) by Sella in 1875. This institution allowed for the 
provision  of  more  adequate  funding  for  local  government 
indebtedness and for the activation of an important channel of 
institutional  placement  of  treasury  bonds,  as  an  alternative  to 
emission by banks. 
The  second  operation  was  the  foundation  of  the  Treasury  by 
Agostino Depretis in 26 December 1877.  
                                                           
5 Buyback:  the repurchase of outstanding shares by a company in order to reduce the number of shares on 
the market. 
6 Guarantor: A surety. One who guarantees payment.  A person, firm, or corporation, as the bank, may 
agree to guarantee a note for another party and become liable by endorsement to pay the obligations in 
case of failure or default by the original market (principal debtor).  
 
7 Callable bonds: bonds that may be called for redemption before compulsory maturity as a result of the 
option exercised by the debtor (issuer), recited in the bond indenture and frequently on the face of the 
bond certificate. Bonds are often issued subject to call, i.e., redemption in whole or in part on any interest 
date, upon proper notice. Callable bonds are also known as optional bonds or redeemable bonds.  
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However, only on 18 March 1889 was there a clear separation between the Ministry of Finance and the 
Treasury. The first Treasury Minister was Giovanni Giolitti (9 March 1989).  
After those events the forced currency was abolished under Agostino Magliani, who was Treasury and 
Finance Minister. He wanted to reduce the number of national bank notes in circulation from 940 to 340 
million, paying for 600 of these in gold or silver coming from foreign countries. With this operation exports 
decreased, foreign payments increased and the price of gold started to go down. This result was not only 
due to this action but also to the deteriorating national and international economies from 1888 to 1893.  
The advertising expenditure of the railways for 30 years also contributed to increasing the public debt. To 
transfer railway property into private hands seemed to be a good idea in the short term, but not in the long 
term.  Even with the big loan that the State gave to the private societies, the people’s needs could not be 
satisfied. For this reason, the government reacquired the property of the Roman railways and those of Alta 
Italia. At the end of the above negotiations, there was an annual burden of 39.5 million Lire.  
In that period, the annual net product of the nation was about 34 million Lire. 
On 29 June 1879, with the left-wing in power, the construction of 6,070 kilometers of railway lines began. 
This opera cost about 1,260 million between 1880 and 1900. On 27 April 1885 the railways that were not 
already of state property were purchased. With the law of 27 April 1885 all the Italian railways were 
administered by three private societies.  
In 1888, on observing the initial cost estimate for the railways, the government discovered that the real 
amount was 2,431 million Lire. 
There  were  no  other  significant  actions  till  1905,  when  the  parliament  discussed  the  renewal  of  the 
contract with the three societies. In that year, the re-appropriation of all railways by the State was voted 
and 910 million Lire was spent to update the existing railroad and 1 billion Lire to pay the three companies. 
Another  530  million  Lire  was  estimated  as  necessary  expenditure  for  the  development  of  State 
interventions.  
The public debt increment was also due to the following public works: 
  50 million Lire in 1881 granted for public works in Rome. 
  170 million Lire in 1883 for a public guarantee granted for a bond of the City of Rome and for 
necessary work on the River Tiber. 
  The assumption of interest payments of the City of Naples, which was a debt that the city could not 
pay, for an amount of 92 million Lire.  
 
From 1889 to 1892, there was the worst period of the first fifty years of the Italian economy, as for the first 
time after Sella’s fiscal adjustment, expenses exceeded public revenues. That crisis was caused by the 
breakdown of commercial relationships with France, the deflation of speculative building, a banking crisis 
and an agrarian crisis.  
With that situation, the government had to find a different way to finance and reorganize the public debt.  
In April 1892 treasury bonds were issued; their maturity was 5 years for interest rates of 4.5%. In this dark 
period the bank system was reordered and in 1893 the Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy) was founded. In this 15 
 
year, there was also the introduction of the affidavit
8 to block the escape of gold from Italy due to the 
growing foreign requests  for the payment of interest rates on public debt bonds.  
In 1894-95, an action was made to put the public debt in order, but with little effect. Only at the beginning 
of the 1900s, the public debt was reordered. Before a balanced budget was made and afterwards there was 
a budget surplus. 
In  1902  a  new  consolidated  bond  with  a  net  3.50%  interest  rate  was  issued  for  the  conversion  of 
redeemable railway bonds and long term Treasury bonds. As that solution produced good results, the 
following year another similar conversion was made.  
Further to the great results of these operations, and the easy sell Certificati di Credito Ferroviari (Railway 
Credit Certificates) issued in 1905 at 3.65%, the government launched the law of the Grande Conversione 
dei Consolidati (big conversion of consolidates) on 29 June 1906 at 5% gross and 4% net. With this law 8 
billion of nominal capital was covered, 60% of the total Italian debt. 
After this law was passed, as of 1 July 1906 the government was authorized to pay off the consolidated 
bonds at 5% gross and 4% net, offering holders either the repayment at par, or the exchange with new 
titles. The new titles had annual interest rates of 3.75% till December 1911 and then 3.5% but free from all 
taxes and not subject to conversion until 1920. Those conversions took place between 2 and 7 July 1906 
with the presence of two Banking Consortiums, one from Italy, directed by Banca d’ Italia, and Rothschild 
from Paris. With this transaction, the Treasury spent just over 9.5 million Lire, saving annually around 20.2 
million till 1911.  
From 1915 to 1924, the state deficits were substantial. The expenditures of the war were paid for with 
national loans. About 20 billion Lire was released, of which only 12.4 was paid in cash. The remainder was 
covered by Treasury bonds or other financial titles. 99% of the war debt was owed to Britain (about 611 
million Pounds) and to the United States (around $1648 million).  
The BOT (Buono Ordinario del Tesoro, Treasury bond) on the market increased from 401 million in 1915 to 
4.1 billion in 1917 and it went up to 24.1 billion in 1922. This debt caused an inflationary process, causing 
the long-term government bonds to become less attractive. In the post-war years, the Italian State had to 
eliminate the deficits and had to try to lengthen the maturity of debt. To resolve the first problem, at the 
end of 1915 the government created a tax on war profits and, in 1919 a property tax. However, these taxes 
gave the state only 20 billion in 25 years.  
The first minister to treat the lengthening of the debt maturity problem was Volpi. He began a negotiation 
with the United States to settle the public debt, but especially to stimulate interest in foreign investment in 
Italy. At the end of the negotiation Italy had to pay an amount of $2,042 million, payable annually from 
1931 to 1986/87. The negotiation with England ended on 27/01/1926, when an agreement was made to 
reduce the debt owed to England from £611 million  to £276.7 million. The Italian government was able to 
obtain an amount of 3.4 billion Lire from Germany  for the war reparations. 
                                                           
8 Affidavit: a written statement subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, commissioner, consul, or 
other officer empowered to administer oaths. The affidavit must contain the affiant’s name and address, 
and the signature of the attesting officer.  
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The main problem in these years were the requests from the United States and England for stabilization of 
the Lira and to return to the gold standard
9 system. After these urgent requests Volpi fixed the lira at 
“quota 90” (90 lire for one pound sterling).  
On 5/08/1927, the Cassa di Ammortamento (Bank Amortization) was founded. This bank had to pay off the 
internal public debt with the surplus on budget expenditure. Until 30/06/1939 this Bank cancelled bonds 
for an amount of 1,850 million Lire. This bank was closed in 1945. 
The causes of this unusual financial structure were the Great Depression of 1929, the crisis due to Lira 
stabilization and Mussolini’s war ventures.   
 
With this situation the Treasury created new loans from the Cash Deposits and Loans. In 1931, 1932 and 
1934, some emissions of titles were made with a maturity of nine years. With the conversion of 3 February 
1934, the government offered redeemable  titles at 3.5%. That interest rate was inappropriate so that 
everybody wanted to sell, even peculators. This operation caused a huge cost for the State. 
 
With  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  Ethiopia,  Italy  needed  new  money.  To  obtain  this  money,  various 
exceptional taxes and a forced loan were made. The forced loan obliged owners of real property (except for 
government agencies, the church and charities) to sign a loan for 25 years at 5% of the value of the 
property. For the loan service the landlords also had to pay an extraordinary housing tax of 3.5% for 25 
years. This amount would cover the interest payments and loan repayment after 25 years. The next loans 
were with a five or nine year maturity and realized a revenue of about 146 million Lire till June 1945.  
 
In June 1939 the public debt was 86% of the GDP and at the end of 1945/46 it was around 33%, decreasing 
to 21% in 1946/47 and increasing in the next  few years to about 30%.  The interest expenditure also 
decreased.  
In 1946 another loan with an interest rate of 3.5% gave 231 million Lire to the State. This loan had an 
interest rate below the market rate, but it was free of all taxes. On April 1947 there was the voluntary 
conversion of those titles into titles of 5%, this operation giving 125 billion Lire to the State.  For the next 
three years there were no other loans since the only long term investment was for the electrification of the 
railways.   
  
In 1950, in order to convert part of the floating debt into medium term debt, treasury bills were offered 
with an interest rate of 5%, maturing in 9 years. This operation converted 107 billion Lire of old multiannual 
treasury bonds and 194 billion Lire of BOT. The total number of BOT in the market decreased by 88 billion 
Lire. The majority of the remaining BOT was possessed by banks. With this operation Italy had a great level 
of stability in its BOT. Between 1945 and 1950, the biggest expansion rates were on the floating debt
10, 
which increased from 63.8% to 75.4% of the public debt.  
 
                                                           
9 Gold standard: among monetary standards, that system in which the standard unit of money is defined in 
terms of gold.  
10 Floating debt: The aggregate of current indebtedness. The term is used for the short term indebtedness 
of a business corporation or of a government, state, or municipally.  17 
 
The cash deficit after the liberation of Italy amounted to 258 billion Lire. 81 billion Lire of that deficit was 
covered by the sale of BOT.  
In 1945, public debt was 53% of the GDP, then it decreased to 23% in the next two years and it was at 30% 
at the end of 1950. The diminution of the public debt-GDP ratio in those five years was also a result of 
inflation. In the financial statement from 1947/48 to 1949/50, there was 1,133 billion Lire of expenditure 
for public works. 
 
From 1951 to 1963, the GDP had an average annual increase of 5.8%, industrial production increased by 
160% with 1.8 million new job opportunities. The fixed investment in the industrial sector increased by 19% 
in 1961. Despite the good economic period in 1951/52 the cash flows of the treasury recorded a deficit of 
335 billion Lire and 234 billion in 1952/53, those were respectively 2.9% and 1.8% of the GDP. 
The public debt continued to increase in absolute value, but it remained around 5% of the GDP because of 
the extraordinary economic growth. From 1953 the ordinary income growth rate was higher than the 
expenditure rate. The same happened in the next seven years and, in the financial years 1959/60 and 
1960/61, there was a surplus.  
In November 1962, a new reform about bond issue was introduced, this said BOT had to separate into two 
parts. One part for the obligatory reserve, assigned to the base price. The second part called “free” sold 
with the Dutch auction method. With this reform of BOT placing, more power to control the creation of 
money was given to the Central Bank. 
The real purpose of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti was to provide funds to local authorities. Only a small part of 
those funds actually reached the local authorities, as the main part of the money collected from this entity 
went to the Ministry of the Treasury. 
The best and most flourishing period for the Italian economy was in the years 1960-70. This prosperous 
economic period was also due to the Marshall plan, according to which the U.S.A. gave loans to Italy. The 
biggest  boom  took  place in  Northern  Italy, where  high  exportation  levels  of  goods and  services  were 
recorded. In that decade only the Japanese economy was better than the Italian economy.  
This growth was possible thanks to some factors common to all European countries, but also due to certain 
specific elements of our country. For example, Italy had a large labour force, adequate basic schooling and 
few, yet excellent, engineers. These were the ideal conditions for a Fordist model economy. 
Up  to  the  mid-1960s,  public  enterprises  under  excellent  managers  helped  to  accelerate  aggregate 
investment.  The  IRI  (Institute  for  Industrial  Research,  1933-2002)  produced  intermediate  goods  at 
competitive prices in sectors where private industry was weak.. 
In that period, when the North was approaching a full level of employment, it was clearly necessary for 
public intervention to adapt institutions, financial markets, research and development in order to suit the 
characteristics of a highly developed economy. However, very little was done in this sense.  18 
 
In 1966, the Bank of Italy guaranteed, by means of operations in the secondary market, returns of around 
6.5% on obligations from special credit institutions, and 5.5% on bonds. Those operations were used to 
increase the liquidity of the money in order to increase the fixed income
11 securities. 
In 1969, it was no longer possible to use the rates set in 1965. That fact caused the end of the policy of 
price stabilization, there  followed a reduction of demand for securities, a decrease in long and medium 
term loans and in investment. 
In the next decade, there was a stop in economic growth due to the  increment in labour costs. This 
increment reduced marginal profit and self-financing of companies. In consequence, enterprises resorted 
to bank loans. In fact, in that period loans increased by 20% compared to those of the previous decade.  
At  the  beginning  of  the  70s,  in  Europe,  the  impetus  from  factors  of  post-war  growth,  for  example 
reconstruction, and the progressive opening up of markets, petered out. That deceleration was maybe also 
due to the first oil shock. 
In 1973, a portfolio limit for all banks  was made  to increase the demand for long and medium term 
securities, and also a maximal value on the expansion of bank lending was introduced. These two forms of 
control had a positive effect on the monetary policy so that investments and the national income increased 
more than forecast.  
From 1971 to 1973, the debt-GDP ratio increased by 11 points. Since sales of BOT between 1969 and 1972 
were few, in 1973 the maturity of the BOT  was shortened from 12 months to 6 or 3 months.  
Current revenues of the government were between 30% and 32% of the GDP from 1963 to 1975. In the 
early 70s, there was the first huge growth of the public debt. The current public expenditure exceeded the 
current revenue.  
In 1973, there was a recovery of income and also of investments. That year’s energy crisis caused an 
aggravation on foreign accounts and inflationary pressure in the short term, which was difficult to control. 
The government made a stabilization programme to limit the deficit of payment  and to lower prices.  
In 1974, a new tax on imported goods was added. Furthermore, a new programme was made (this made 
indirect taxes and tariffs rise), which reduced the deficit of Treasury below the level established with the 
Monetary Fund, but did not stop the inflation. 
In 1975, the deficit was higher than the Monetary Fund level. In 1976, the last forced loan
12 was issued to 
survive the currency crisis.  
In 1977, a stand-by loan was granted by the Monetary Fund. This loan had a negative aspect in the long 
term but allowed for the oil crisis to be overcome with acceptable outcomes. 
                                                           
11 Fixed income: income which does not fluctuate in accordance with the general price level. A period of 
low prices is beneficial and a period of high prices disadvantageous to those having a fixed income.  
12 Forced loan: obligatory loan for an amount proportional to the “investor” possibilities. In the modern 
finance it is not used often cause their obligatoriness, which that decreasing confidence towards the public 
authority.  
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1979 was a permissive year for the monetary policy, which at first allowed for economic recovery. That was 
then stopped by inflation due to the doubling of oil prices. The investment process increased anyway 
thanks to the urgencies of rebuilding.  
From 1976 to 1980, the indirect revenue from public administration increased to a higher percentage than 
the increment of current expenditure. The deficit from the second half of the 70s was due to the imbalance 
between expenditure and revenue in the first half. In the years following 1975 the public debt increased its 
incidence on the GDP from 7% to 11.7%.  
In the 80s, the balance sheet of the public administrator net of interest was positive. It was clear that the 
interest expenditure was significant on the public debt amount. This interest rate did not allow a 
decrement of debt amount.  
With the second oil crisis in 1979, there was a high unemployment level and high inflation. In order to solve 
those problems the Italian government instituted an alliance aimed at reducing civil disorder and creating 
the basis for new growth.  
In 1980, there was the separation between the Treasury and the Central Bank.  
From those years till nowadays, the interest rate is impacting on the public economic balance. In the years 
1982-1983, the deficit between the public expenditure and the GDP was of 6 points. 
In fourteen years, from 1974 to 1987, the public debt became 17 times larger, amounting to 840 billion Lire 
(excluded debt against the Banca d’Italia). The public debt prediction for the future was not good and, for 
this reason, on June 1986 the Minister of the Treasury made a plan to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio in 1990. 
The goal of this draft was to reduce expenditure and to increase revenue. The plan was not about the tax 
burden but about expenditure. 
The new economic growth began as of 1983 and the results were a high increase in welfare and general 
benefits for Italy. 
Up to now a lot of new methods have been made regarding public debt management. One of the crucial 
points in the management of public debt is to avoid various payments of interest rates in the same period.  
Another important point on the management of public debt is the maturity period of loans. In 1981, the 
average maturity of all loans was 9 months. In 1982, in order to extend loan maturity , loans with variable 
rate ( CCT ) were introduced. 
At the end of 1983 the average maturity was one and a half years, which then became three years and four 
months in 1987, and went to three and a half in 1988. At the end of 1987 the BTE in ECU with annual 
maturity appeared on the market. In July 1983, indexation bonds were issued. Those bonds were 
unsuccessful because they were issued without adequate information and the interest rate was too low. 
The government also used postal savings as borrowed money.  
Also the Certificati a Sconto were made. These CTS ( certificates at a discount) had a partly fixed and partly 
variable interest rate. Those stocks did not have great success. After the failure of CTS, the government 
instituted a Lead-Manager and a co-manager group.  20 
 
The public debt assumed a strange structure compared to other countries: Italian public debt contains 80% 
of the short maturity stock. One essential condition to have a good financial market is to have fixed rate 
long maturity stocks.  
Between 1973 and 1992 the per capita GDP grew with an average rate of 2.5 per cent per year. In 1992 the 
per capita GDP in Italy was equal to that in Germany and in the United Kingdom.  
The importance of policy decisions thus grew. Inflation was higher in Italy than in the countries it competed 
with. However, again nothing was done in terms of reforms, which were indispensable.  
The quality of the school system deteriorated, the time for the justice in civil and administrative courts 
lengthened. There were also the weakening of public and private enterprises. The labour market became 
more rigid. 
Italy remained locked into a production concentrated in sectors with low or medium technology, although 
there was a continuous request in many sector for the quality “made in Italy”.  
It is important to know that before the 80s the Italian economy was a free economy characterized by strong 
State  control.  Another  important  fact  was  the  optimal  mentality  of  State  enterprise,  which  worked 
efficiently for the country’s growth.  
From the mid-80s the public sector began to change. Many state employees stole public money in order to 
have a higher standard of living. Moreover, the management of State companies became similar to a policy 
of political favours and this fact caused high corruption. From those years onwards the collapse of the 
economy started, which then culminated with the 1990 crisis. 
After this crisis all Italian people, for the first time, understood the extent of the  problem of public debt in 
their economy. The government tried to reduce the State’s impact on the economy. At the end of the 80s 
Alfa Romeo, which was State property, was privatised.  
In order to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU), the Italian government had to decrease inflation, 
reduce the public deficit and the interest rate. The government applied some measures, which allowed  
Italy to enter the European Monetary Union.  
In the year from 1998 to 1999 the economy saw another boom. This time, differently from the first boom, 
the main protagonists of the new growth were the small and medium sized firms in the north of Italy. The 
importance of big firms began to decrease.  
The latter boom was also due to the social partnership pact brokered by the government with the Italian 
people. That partnership stated flexible working hours, lower wages, part-time contracts and so on. These 
actions were also applied in the public sector. From 1992 to 1998 more than 500,000 public workers passed 
to the private sector. In fact the main State firms of that time were privatised, such as  Agip, Italgas, Credito 
Italiano,  Telecom  Italia,  Alitalia,  Tirrenia  and  many  others.  With  this  new  growth  investments  in 
technological development and job security were also made.  
The occupation increased more in small and medium-sized firms because they had an easier flexibility but 
were less capacity for research and development. It was probably thanks to this characteristic that Italy 
could maintain its share of the world export market. 21 
 
In 1994 the public expenditure reached the 44% of GDP, which was 27% in 1960. Approximately 70% of 
that increase was due to pensions and healthcare. That increase was amplified by the growth in interest 
payments.  At  the  beginning  of  90’  the  primary  budget  balance  (budget  balance  net  of  interest)  was 
achieved.  
On 1991 per capita GDP was equal to 76% of the US value. From that it started 20 years of economic 
setback. Other countries in the Europe, although less precipitously, feel back.  
From 1992 to 2000 the Italian per capita GDP grew with an average of 1.7% every year. 
As of  1992, the Italian Treasury changed the structure of its liabilities. The public debt management policy 
in Italy followed the Maastricht Treaty. In 1992, the law regarding the organization and structure of reforms 
in the field of public debt management were approved. 
During 1996 there was a diminution of the primary balance from 4.4 to 4.0%, due to an acceleration of 
private spending levels. Prodi’s government made further efforts to reduce the deficit by including a fiscal 
manoeuvre in 1997 which produced positive results. In the same period the interest rate on public debt 
dropped.  
 
Between 1995 and 2000 the Italian economic problem was clear observing only the productivity. In fact the 
increase on that was half that of the euro area countries. This negative trend was partially due to the 
increase in employment, resulting from reforms of labour market law, at the same time of a deceleration in 
the growth of GDP. In fact, on 1995 the unemployment rate had the maximum value in the history of Italian 
economy. 
In  the  next  seven  years,  per  capita  GDP  grow  rate  had  an  average  increase  of  0.5%  per  year  and 
productivity growth rate had a diminution. In 2005 the latter rate was negative. 
Between 2005 and 2007 Italy was hit by a crisis of the real sector. As result of these years of economic 
contraction the per capita GDP in 2010 was equal the one in 1999. 
In Italy in the year 2000 there was little economic growth, indeed it was the smallest of all the countries 
which  had  created  the  European  Monetary  Union.  Despite  the  slowest  growth,  the  economy  index 
remained acceptable. The problem was the high unemployment rate in some parts of southern Italy and 
the continued increase in crime. In order to solve these latter problems, the government facilitated the 
emergence of new firms in the south. It proposed benefits for people wanting to start up new firms or hire 
new workers. As result of this action, from 1997 to 2000, approximately 100,000 people found jobs in 
southern Italy. Another important cause of the slow growth in Italy was the phenomenen of  illegal work. 
The government also promoted actions to favour legal work.  
Nowadays, in 2011-2012, the Italian economy Is in recession because of the global crisis and the serious 
problem of public debt. The main economic index shows that there is not enough private consumption in 
Italy and there is a reduction in investments.  
Other negative aspects of the Italian economy are both expectations of inflation and the increase in the 
consumer price index. The main cause of the latter problem is the continued growth of oil prices. 
Also, the unemployment rate is growing nowadays. 22 
 
The last reforms by the government of Mr. Mario Monti regarded pensions, the liberalization of markets 
and products, the promotion of competition, less bureaucracy and lower tax evasion and lower public 
expenditure. 
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6.  Theoretical framework 
Most of the previous studies about public debt refer to the relationship between public debt and economic 
growth. In particular there are two schools of thought: the first one is the Ricardian theory which denies 
the presence of long term effects between these two variables; the second one is the conventional theory 
which asserts the existence of a relationship between debt and growth due to the accumulation of capital. 
 
6.a  The Ricardian equivalence proposition 
The Ricardian equivalence states that the government can raise money either by means of taxes or by 
issuing bonds. Moreover, it states that with these two methods, the effect on aggregate demand would be 
the same. In fact, the consumer knows that when there is an increase in debt, there will be an increase in 
future taxes and so they save money today in order to be able to pay those future taxes. This means the 
aggregate demand remains the same with an increase in tax burden or selling bonds.  
The Ricardian equivalence assumes the following hypotheses:  
1.  The capital market is perfect (it is possible to borrow and lend at the same single rate); 
2.  A guarantee, with intergenerational ties,  that the present generation doesn’t benefit from tax 
reduction at the expense of their descendants . 
3.  Taxes should not influence agents’ choices. 
The intertemporal government constraint is expressed by the following equation: 
(6.1)                                –       
where the volume of real government expenditure during period t is called Gt, which is assumed to be 
exogenous. The real tax revenue obtained by the government in each period is called Ƭt  and the real stock 
of public debt at time t is Dt. The real rate of return on public and private debts, r ,is assumed to be 
constant.  
The Ricardian equivalence is based on two main ideas: the intertemporal government constraint and the 
assumption of perpetual income. The latter means that families plan their spending and savings considering 
at the same time both current and future flow values. For the assumption of perpetual income an exchange 
on taxes by the government in a different time period does not influence the aggregated demand.  
The conclusion of this work by Ricardo views the public debt merely as a transfer of taxation in time. 
Obviously this equivalence doesn’t state that fiscal policies are inefficient on public debt. For example, if 
the  government  decreases  the  tax  burden  and,  at  the  same  time  implements  acts  to  reduce  public 
expenditure, household income will increase and there will be an increase in consumption. 
This theorem is the basis of some theories for optimal public finance.  
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Since this theorem is based on strong assumptions, it has some limits: 
  The assumption of a perfect capital market is, in most circumstances, untrue. For example, it is 
possible that some consumers think they have more utility with current consumption than that of 
the future. 
  The  assumption  about  intergenerational  ties  is  more  realistic  than  the  perfect  capital  market 
assumption. Since the future generations are the children of current generations, it is strange to 
think that a parent can benefit to the detriment of the child. 
  The Ricardian equivalence does not consider a final moment when the debt must be repaid, since it 
is viewed as a possibility to defer the tax burden. If the government decides to  reduce the tax 
burden with some debt issuance, it is sure that in the next year the government will not be able to 
cover the debt with a high tax burden but it will have to issue new bonds. Hence the debt will rise 
every year. The sustainability of the previous mechanism depends on the economy growth rate. 
When this rate is higher than bond interest rate, a new debt may be issued to cover the prior debt. 
If the growth economy rate is lower than bond interest rate, it is not possible to cover the old debt 
with new issue bonds. In this situation either the tax burden will be increased or bankruptcy will be 
declared. 
  As in all economic models, consumer rationality is assumed. It is presumed that consumers want 
optimal utility in the long term. In real life this is not true and also not everybody knows the future 
effect of a reduction in the tax burden. 
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6.b  Keynesian theory 
This theory states an impact on savings, capital accumulation and national income by public debt. In an 
open economy the public debt also impacts on the currency exchange rate. Keynes states that a reduction 
in the tax burden or an increase in public expenditure, followed by an increase in debt, is an act to apply in 
a recession period in order to stimulate the economy. This is because prices and salaries presumably 
remain constant in the short term. 
On the other hand, in the long term, prices and the cost of productive factors are no longer constant. 
The budget constraint of the private sector is described by the following equation: 
 (6.2)                        
where Y is the national income amount, C the consumption amount, S the saving amount and T the tax 
amount.  
The national income is given by the equation below 
(6.3)                                     
where I is the domestic investment amount, G the public expenditure amount and NX the net exports 
amount of goods and services. From those previous equations it is possible to write as follows 
(6.4)                                     
(6.5)                   –                 
Keynes also states that, with an approximation, the net exports amount of goods and services can be 
viewed  as net foreign investments (NFI), thus 
(6.6)                   –                  
Observing the last equation it is possible to state that the creation of deficit, due to a reduction in the tax 
burden, can be covered by an increment in private savings, with a reduction in domestic investment or 
foreign investment. 
The reduction in net foreign investments leads to the contraction of citizens’ income, besides a reduction in 
net exports. The trade balance deficit and the public deficit are very closely linked. When one of them 
increases, the other one also increases. A country having a high public debt will surely also have a high 
interest rate. The central bank may reduce both of these by means of a suitable monetary policy. Such a 
policy works in the short term, whereas real rates remain virtually unaltered in the long term. Thus nominal 
rates will be raised as a result of inflation.        
In accordance with the last equation, it is possible to understand that a reduction in public saving may be 
covered by an increment in private saving. In real life this situation is unlikely to happen, and this fact 
causes a reduction in both foreign and domestic investment. In the long term this reduction will, in turn, 
cause a reduction in capital stock, which will then lead to a reduction in labour productivity. The first 
important result of this cycle is a reduction in real wages and aggregate output. The second one is an 
increase in the interest rate on bonds. 26 
 
6.c  Other studies 
Other models have been developed up to the present and the main results are listed below: 
  Harrod-Domar’s model: this was developed in 1946 to explain the growth rate of an economy in 
terms of savings and capital productivity levels. Harrod assumed that change of capital stock is 
equal to national savings. 
  (6.7)                     
  Where            with s being a marginal propensity to save and Y the national productivity, 
                    since                with     being the change in national productivity. 
  Harrod’s paper states that knowing K (capital stock) and S (total saving), it will be possible to know 
  the growth rate guaranteed in one country by the following equation: 
  (6.8)                       
  Solow’s model: this was developed from the above-mentioned model for the first time in 1956 by 
Robert Solow. He was inspired by the Cobb-Douglas function : 
(6.9)                       
  where Y represents the aggregate output (total production), K capital stock (corporate capital or 
  risk capital is the capital that shareholders contribute to the company), L the workforce, A scale 
  parameter and E work productivity. The parameters α and β are positive and their sum is equal to 
  1:          . 
In a closed economy this study asserts that an increase in public expenditure or in debt have a 
negative impact on growth. In particular, if the ratio between deficit and output is higher than the 
following critical level 
(6.10)      
       
     
where g is the fraction of the national revenue used for public expenditure         , the growth 
rate is negative.  The growth rate of the debt will be 
  (6.11)            ̂  
   
   
  with D the debt amount. This growth rate will be constant if 
  (6.12)         
 
   
 
            
  Where b is the fraction of the deficit which is created to finance public expenditure.  
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  Olg  model  (overlapping  generations  model):  The  first  economist  who  introduced  this  kind  of 
model was Irving Fisher (1930) in The Theory of Interest.  
  An overlapping generations model is an economic model which considers the agents’ length of life 
  finite, but long enough to also play a role in the subsequent generation.  The life of the people in 
  this project was viewed as two separate periods: the young period and the old period. N
t
t denoted 
  the number of people born in every period. N 
t-1
t denoted the number of old people alive in period 
  t. In the first analysis period there are surely people who are already old. Those people were called 
  “initial old” and denoted with N0. An assumption was also made that people do not die young in life 
  in order to have     
         
    
  Since the future generation has to pay the debt of the old generation, those models were used for 
  the  public  financing  of  government  debt.  The  main  consideration  recognized  by  this  article 
  regarded the level of sustainability: this factor depends on public debt, demographics, current and 
  future spending .   
  Using  this  model  Barro  (1974)  in  his  paper  “Are  government  bonds  net  wealth?”  focused  on 
  whether an increase in government debt constitutes an increase in perceived household wealth. 
  The basic conclusion of this paper was that there isn’t a persuasive theoretical case for treating 
  government debt as a net component of perceived household wealth.   
  An important result by OGM models was the fact that if the economic and population growth rates 
  don’t match, there will be problems of deficit for the economy. 
  Diamond, in a review of these models, also shows that citizens save more than what is socially 
  optimal when the competitive equilibrium of economy has dynamic inefficiency.  
Other studies have been carried out on public debt but most of them are reviews of those mentioned 
above. 
From the previous studies we can understand that the variables which are closely linked to public debt are: 
capital stock, savings, GDP, the workforce, GDP growth rate, foreign direct investment, taxes and interest 
rates. It also seems that demographic variables can have an impact on public debt.  
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6.d  Reference article 
Many articles have discussed the public debt problem, but the work by Sinha et al.(2011) has a similar 
structure to mine, although some variables are different. 
Their aim of is to understand which factors influence public debt in middle and high income group countries 
using  Panel  regression.  The  following  methods  were  utilized:  the  total  effects  model,  the  fixed  effect 
model, the random effect model and an autoregressive multiple regression model. The authors estimated 
two models: one for the middle income countries and one for the high income countries. The dependent 
variable  was  public  debt  to  GDP  ratio,  while  they  studied  the  following  independent  variables:    the 
countries’  current  account  balance,  their  central  government’s  expenditure,  their  prevailing  long  term 
interest rate, their real GDP growth rate, their annual inflation of consumer prices, their foreign direct 
investment, and the number of people per sq. km per country. 
The authors report a table such as the following one to summarize the results of their analysis. 
Variable 
Middle Income Group Countries  High Income Group Countries 
Total 
effect 
Fixed 
Cross 
section  
Random 
Cross 
section  
Auto 
regressive 
model 
Total 
effect 
Fixed 
Cross 
section  
Random 
Cross 
section  
Auto 
regressive 
model 
Current account 
balance  I  S  S  S  I  S  S  I 
Expenditure  S  I  I  I  I  S  S  I 
FDI  S  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Inflation  S  S  S  I  I  I  I  I 
Interest rate  S  S  S  I  NA  NA  NA  I 
Population density  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Population over 65  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
GDP growth  S  S  S  S  S  S  S  S 
Table 6.1 Results from the article by Sinha, Pankaj (2011) 
 
Where:  
  I: insignificant factor 
  S: significant factor 
  NA: not applicable 
 
 It will be interesting to build a table as the above in order to compare our results with these results. 
The major sources of data in the MPRA paper were World Bank dataset, OECD statsbook, IMF forecasts and 
CIA world fact book.  Since Italy is among the high income group countries, we only intend to repeat the 
analysis carried out for this group. We will check whether it is really possible to create a dataset in the way 
the authors of this article did, that is by mixing data from various sources.  
At  the end of the theoretical framework we decided to analyse the following variables: inflation, Balance of 
payments, population over 65 years old, density of population, population growth, public expenditure, FDI 
inflow and outflow and GDP growth rate. 
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7.  Panel data 
For the purposes of understanding elaborated panel data in Stata I used the following publications: 
Bontempi and Golinelli (2004), Vuri(2004),Wooldridge (1999), Russel et al. (1993) and Barro (1979). 
7.a  Structure of panel data 
Panel data are collected for the same group of subjects over different times. In our context the subjects are 
the different countries and the time is the different years. To get a clear idea, a general structure of panel 
data is represented in Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1 The final structure of the database. 
 
As an example, Sinha et al.(2011), use 10 temporal observations and 19 countries (statistical units) for the 
public debt / GDP ratio variable and for 9 independent variables. 
The availability of information of this type allows us to specify models that are more flexible than the 
normal cross series ones. 
However, automatic pooling of all the observations implies hypotheses of behaviour homogeneity of the 19 
different countries, with the consequent restrictions that might not be very credible. Homogeneity cannot 
therefore be sustained  in advance, because different countries in different historical periods could have 
different attitudes to public debt. 
The data dependent variable yit that we wish to explain is potentially influenced by many more factors than 
the observed xit  as those presented in chapter 6. The model originates as a simplification of reality. We 
will undoubtedly have omitted some explanatory factors of various kinds, as below: 
1.  Those  which  vary  per  individual  country  but  remain  constant  in  time  (such  as  the  physical 
characteristics of the country) 
2.  Those which vary only in time (such as the economic cycle) 
3.  Those which vary both in time and per individual county 
TIME   COUNTRIES   VARIABLES  
      variable 1   variable 2  variable 3  - - - - - -  variable n 
year 1   country 1                 
year 2  country 1                 
---
 
---
                
year T  country 1                 
year 1   country 2                 
year 2  country 2                 
---
 
---
                
year T  country 2                 
---
 
---
                
---
 
---
                
year 1   country N                
---
 
---
                
year T  country N                30 
 
The econometric approach to panel data supposes the possibility of highlighting two error types: 
  ci relative to omission typology 1; ci is called unobserved individual effect 
  uit relative to omission typologies 2 and 3; uit is called idiosyncratic error (disturbance) 
The total effect of the omitted explanatory factors is therefore represented by the sum of the latter: 
(7.1)                           
with the hypothesis that the covariance between ci and uit is equal to 0. 
The specification of the model will be the following: 
(7.2)                                
The panel model allows for better utilization of the individual variability of the data to take into account 
omitted effects.  
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7.b  Estimation methods 
Before describing the various estimator methods, we need to define the following notations: 
 
  INDIVIDUAL AVERAGE: 
    (7.3)     ̅   
∑      
   
    (7.4)      ̅   
∑      
   
 
  TOTAL AVERAGE: 
    (7.5)     ̅  
∑ ∑        
     
∑  ̅   
   
    (7.6)      ̅  
∑ ∑        
      
∑   ̅   
   
 
  WITHIN TRANSFORMATIONS: 
  (7.7)          ∑ ∑         ̅   
     
    (7.8)          ∑ ∑          ̅   
     
    (7.9)          ∑ ∑ [        ̅              ̅  ]      
 
  BETWEEN TRANSFORMATIONS: 
    (7.10)            ∑   ̅       ̅   
    (7.11)            ∑    ̅        ̅   
    (7.12)            ∑   ̅       ̅    ̅      ̅   
 
  DEVIATIONS FROM THE AVERAGE: 
    (7.13)          ∑ ∑         ̅  
                
    (7.14)          ∑ ∑          ̅  
                
    (7.15)          ∑ ∑ [        ̅              ̅ ]                  
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 Pooled ols 
 
(7.16)                       
 
  where                 are composite errors. 
   
  Hypothesis of specification : 
                    the true link between y and x 
       
           which implies that      
         . This condition is necessary for consistency. 
 
  The estimation method used will be OLS (pooled), with the following results: 
  (7.17)      ̂
     
   
   
  
  (7.18)      ̂        ̅     ̂
       ̅ 
 
  
In the presence of individual effects correlated 
with  the  explanatory  variables,  the  OLS 
estimations are biased and not consistent . The 
pooled OLS  estimator does not consider the fact 
that  T  temporal  observations  for  N  different 
individuals are not necessarily the same thing as 
NT  different  individuals.  The  pooled  OLS 
estimator virtually ignores the panel structure of 
the  data  that  distinguishes  two  types  of  data 
variability:  within  and  between.  The  graph 
shows how the estimator sees the observations; 
it  is  like  a  large  cross-section  of  unconnected 
cases.    
 
Graph 7.1 How the OLS (pooled) estimator sees the observations. 
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 Fixed effects model 
(7.19)                          
Assuming fixed effects means to assume that the differences between the individuals are characterised by 
the differences in the constant term . 
Specification hypothesis: 
  We allow individual effects    to be correlated with     
  (7.19) is the true link between y and x 
  For the consistency of fixed effects estimator we only need strict erogeneity assumption  
     |           for t= 1,…..,T 
The estimation method used is called OLS with dummy variables (least squares with dummy variables, 
LSDV)  
  (7.20)       ̂
      
   
   
  
  (7.21)       ̂             ̅     ̂
        ̅  
  (7.22)      ̂      
∑   ̂         
 
 
If the real DGP is (7.16) but it is estimated by the LSDV method, the estimator is still correct and consistent, 
but  inefficient.  The  FE  model  gives  no  importance  to  the  variability  between  individuals  because  the 
individual  components     ̅  and   ̅   are  subtracted  from  the  observations       and       ,  it  considers  the 
deviations. The LSDV estimator only uses the internal variability within each individual.(see graphs below) 
Graph 7.2 Mean of the debt / GDP ratio in each country                                  Graph 7.3 How the FE estimator sees the observations.                                                                                                                                         
 
The relevant information for the within transformation of the debt/GDP ratio is that of the distances 
between the mean of each country and the debt/GDP curve. If  xit has no temporal variability, its within 
transformation always assumes a value of zero and the corresponding coefficient cannot be estimated. 
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 Random effects model 
(7.23)                    where                are composite errors. 
Specification hypothesis for the consistency of random effects model: 
  (7.23) is the real link between y and x; 
  Strict exogeneity:       |           for t=1,…..,T.  
  Independence in mean between ci and xi,      |        where                    
Idiosyncratic error terms     are homoscedastic and uncorrelated : 
   (   
 )     
  
                
  Not correlated with individual effects               
 
The error term composed of vit  will therefore have:  
  E[vit]=0 
  E[vit
2]= σc
2 + σu
2 where σc
2 is the variance of ci 
                    
  (t≠s). The errors of country i at different times are correlated; 
                     (i≠j). The errors of country i and country j are never correlated.  
The estimation method for this model Is GLS:  
  (7.24)      ̂        ̅           ̅ 
  (7.25)      ̂
     
(           )
          
  
  (7.26)       
  
 
  
      
   
The GLS estimator of the model with random effects uses information both on variability within and on 
variability between. The parameter θ is the weight the GLS estimator attributes to the variability between 
the individuals; in fact, from (7.25) it can be noted that: 
  θ = 0 →    ̂    ≡   ̂      because there is a variability of the individual effects   
  much higher than 
        than   
  
  θ = 1 →   ̂    ≡   ̂     
Depending on the values of θ ,   ̂    moves closer to the estimate with fixed effects or to the pooled one 
(without individual effects). 
The    ̂      estimator  on  generated  data  from  the  model  of  type  (7.18)  is  correct  and  consistent,  but 
inefficient. 
The pooled OLS and LSDV are  “all-or-nothing” ways of using the information between individuals: 
OLS looks at all the sources of variability without distinction (“all”), whereas LSDV gives no importance 
(“nothing”) to the between variability.  
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The  GLS  estimator  thus  represents  the 
intermediate  case  between  two  extreme 
approaches  in  considering  the  individual 
effects:              
all  the  same  →  total  poolability  (OLS)  or    
all different →totally non poolable (LSDV). 
The  transformation  BE  does  not  consider 
the single observation but concentrates on 
the mean values for each country. 
 
graph 7.4 The relevant information is the differences between the 
 averages of each country and the mean of all the countries together 
 
 
We can say that the RE is obtained as the weighted average of the between and within estimators, where 
the importance depends on the relative variance of the two estimators. 
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 Fixed effects or random effects? 
 
The fixed effects model is easier to use than the random effects one, moreover the LSDV estimator is 
robust to the omission of time-invariant explanatory variables. In cases where the random effect is valid, 
the LSDV estimator is still consistent, it has just less efficiency. Usually the fixed effect model is the first step 
for panel data analysis. Because the assumption     |        is not needed the fixed effect analysis is more 
robust than random effect analysis. 
The random effects approach takes into account the variability between and within the countries, while the 
fixed effects just the within one. For the latter, if the specification (7.23) is true the random effects method 
is more efficient than the fixed effects method. The random effect considers the individual effects as a 
stochastic variable such as the error term. This method allows us to also take into account variables which 
are constant over time.  
The choice between random effect and fixed effect depends on the following characteristics: 
  If the individual effects are caused by a high number of random circumstances and are 
unobservable, it is better to use the random effect. 
   If the database has a high number of countries and a short period of time observation, it is 
better to use the random effects method. 
  When the sample is closed the fixed effects method is the first solution, whereas if the 
sample is open (N individual extract from a population) it is better to use the random 
effects model. In our case the random effects methods is more appropriate. 
 
The statistical answer to this question is found by the Hausman test. This test has the following hypothesis:  
 
H0:  Cov(xit , ci) = 0 
H1:  Cov(xit , ci) ≠ 0 
Under H0 the RE model is the best, whereas under H1 the statistical properties of the GLS estimator of the 
RE model are not valid. The LSDV estimator of the FE model is consistent both under H0 and under H1 , 
whereas it is not efficient under H0. 
Under H0 the estimates will therefore be statistically similar and so the choice will be the GLS of the RE 
model. Vice versa under H1. 
The Hausman test statistic is: 
(7.27)      (    ̂        ̂ )
 
[   (    ̂        ̂ )]
  
(    ̂        ̂ ) 
 
which has a   
  distribution under H0. The problem is    (    ̂        ̂ ). 
 
Hausman states that the covariance between an efficient estimator and its difference with an inefficient 
one is zero (7.28): 
 
(7.28)      [      ̂   (    ̂        ̂ )]      (     ̂      ̂ )      (     ̂ )     
 
From the latter result we can state: 
 
(7.29)      (    ̂        ̂ )      (    ̂ )      (     ̂ )       (     ̂       ̂ )       (     ̂ )            ̂   37 
 
8.   The creation of the dataset 
As described in Chapter 1 our goal is to create an econometric model aimed at explaining the public debt / 
GDP ratio over time. For this reason a list of countries having similar economic characteristics to Italy was 
chosen. In order to select the appropriate countries, we made use of how the oecd separated nations into 
the high income or the low income categories. Italy is one of the high income countries and so we used the 
data regarding a total of the following 19 countries: 
  Australia  
  France 
  Germany 
  Italy 
  Japan 
  United states 
  Canada 
  Republic of Korea 
  Denmark 
  Czech Republic 
  Greece 
  Hungary 
  Ireland 
  Portugal 
  Poland 
  Spain 
  Slovak Republic  
  Sweden 
  Switzerland 
All the variables we want to include in the dataset, derived from the economic theory, are listed below : 
  Government debt as a percentage of the GDP 
  Balance of payments: current account balance 
  Foreign Direct Investments (inward and outward) 
  Inflation 
  Population density 
  Population over 65 
  GDP growth 
  Public Expenditure 
  Population growth 
We use a balanced dataset similar to the one used by Sinha et al. (2011). We are not interested in having 
exactly the same dataset, we rather need a dataset which contains the most important variables. For 
example, we are not interested in  having in our dataset the variable long term interest rate because it does 
not seem to affect the public debt. Regarding the expenditure variables, we are interested only in the value 38 
 
of government expenditure. In the reference article the values of specific expenditure are also considered 
as Military expenditure and education expenditure. 
At  first  we  tried  to  create  a  balanced  dataset  from  the  World  Bank  website 
(http://data.worldbank.org/topic). We wanted to analyse the data from 1993 to 2010. However, due to the 
lack of some data, we realized it was impossible to do so.  
Specifically: 
For Australia, the values of debt from 1993 to 1998 are not available. For Japan, we cannot know the value 
of debt from 1993 to 2004. For the United States, instead, the values of debt are unavailable from 1993 to 
2000. For the Republic of Korea it is not possible to obtain the data on debt from 1998 to 2000. The value 
of Polish debt is available only from 2001 to 2004. As for the Slovak Republic we can only obtain the value 
of debt from 2003 to 2010. We do not have the data regarding Switzerland’s debt for the years 2009 and 
2010. The debt value is also unavailable in 1993 and 1994 for France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary and Spain. The debt amount is available only for the years 2001 to 2004 in Poland. We have the 
values for the Portuguese debt  from 1994 to 2010. For the variable balance we have only two missing 
values: for the year 1998 in Greece and for the year 2001 in the Slovak Republic. For the latter two states 
we do not have the values of Foreign Direct Investment from 1993 to 1998 (outflow) and in 1998 (inflow) 
for Greece, and in the year 2001 in the Slovak Republic (inflow and outflow). It is not possible to have the 
value of the Irish GDP growth from the year 1993 to 2000 either. For Ireland we do not have the value of 
inflation for the years 1993 to 2000 either. All the unavailable data is summarized in Table 8.1. 
   Debt  balance  FDI in  FDI out  GDP growth  Inflation 
Australia  1993-1998                
France   1993,1994                
Germany   1993,1994                
Italy   1993,1994                
Japan  1993-2004                
United States  1993-2000                
Canada                   
Korea, Rep.  1998-2010                
Denmark   1993,1994                
Czech Republic                   
Greece  1993,1994   1998  1998  1993-1998       
Hungary   1993,1994                
Ireland   1993-1997           1993-2000  1993-2000 
Portugal   1993-1996             
  Poland  1993-2000; 2005-2010                
Spain   1993,1994                
Slovak Republic  1993-2002  2001  2001  2001       
Sweden   1993,1994                
Switzerland  2009;2010                
Table 8.1 In this table only the years for which we do not have the value of data are reported. 
We therefore have a problem, our dataset is not balanced. In order to obtain a balanced dataset we need 
to integrate the dataset built with data from the World Bank website with data from the other websites. 39 
 
This operation is not straightforward, because it is necessary for the variables from the two websites to be 
mutually consistent. In order to observe whether we can integrate our dataset with the data from other 
websites, we are going to make the difference between the common variables. If these differences range 
from tiny to none, it means that the variables are  mutually consistent. 
Observing that difference, we found that almost all variables are mutually consistent. We have an issue for 
the FDI (outflow) data in Hungary, in fact the difference value is more than 40% in years 2007 and 2008.  
However the main problem is for the variable debt. In fact the difference between the values in the various 
websites are more than 20% for many countries. Thus, we cannot integrate the data from World Bank with 
data from other websites.  
Several techniques can be used in order to obtain a balanced dataset, the two most usually are: 
  Partial  deletion:  it  consists  in  the  elimination  of  missing  values,  in  order  to  obtain  a  reduced 
dataset, but balanced. (this is the methods we used in the comparison above). This is the easiest 
method to manage the missing value, but using this technique we are going to lost information and 
this fact is always bad. 
  Imputation: This technique substitutes plausible values for the missing value. More information 
about this technique. It is possible to have more information reading Rubi, and Little(2002). We are 
not interested to this method because it is not commonly used for macroeconomic data.  
Obviously it is better to use real data and, for this reason, we tried to make a balanced dataset with real 
data from the period 1993 to 2008. In order to obtain that, we checked a lot of websites which have 
economic data such as World Bank, Eurostat, oecd, International Monetary Fund and so on. We observed 
that the oecd database(http://stats.oecd.org/) contains almost all the values we need. Thus, we decided to 
make a dataset using as the main source the data from the oecd website, integrating it with values from 
other websites. To be precise, we integrated the missing values with the dataset from the World Bank and 
Eurostat because their values are mutually consistent in certain cases that interest us. 
For the variables regarding the population we used the values from the World Bank website.  
In the end we were unable to find the data on foreign direct investment in Greece for the years 1993 to 
1998. So, our dataset had 6 missing values, which were not available on any Internet websites. In order to 
understand whether Greece should be included or not, or whether to delete 6 years for each country, we 
carried  out  sensitivity  analysis  (see  appendix).  After  these  analyses  we  chose  to  create  the  dataset 
containing the values for all the 19 countries from 1999 to 2008. 
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9.    Preliminary analysis 
Our dataset therefore contains the data for the following variables: 
  Government debt 
  Balance of payments: Current account balance 
  GDP growth 
  Foreign Direct Investment (inflow and outflow) 
  Inflation 
  Public expenditure 
  Population aged 65 and above 
  Population density, number of people per sq. km of land area 
  Population growth 
For the following countries : 
  Australia  
  France 
  Germany 
  Italy 
  Japan 
  United states 
  Canada 
  Republic of Korea 
  Denmark 
  Czech Republic 
  Greece 
  Hungary 
  Ireland 
  Portugal 
  Poland 
  Spain 
  Slovak Republic  
  Sweden 
  Switzerland 
 
For the period of time from 1999 to 2008 we have gathered 190 observations for each variable considered. 
We therefore intend to shape our econometric model using this data. 
Our model will be like the following: 
(9.1)                                
If the behavior of each country is similar, pooling is more advisable. This is as data pertinent to the other 
countries may be used to make up for the little knowledge available for one particular country. 
It is essential to avoid presuming that all countries will show similar characteristics. 
This chapter is going to describe the variables in our dataset in a precise way. In particular we will report 
the definitions of each variable and how it is calculated, as well as its relation with the dependent variable. 42 
 
Moreover, we will carry out three single simple regressions on the dependent variable (OLS pool, fixed 
effects and random effects method) for each variable. This is in order to note whether there are differences 
in terms of estimates between these single regressions and the regressions containing all the variables 
together.  
9.a  Sources of variability 
Before doing the above, we want to know the characteristics of the concerned variables in terms of their 
means and their variability between and within the States.  
 
From  Table  9.1  it  can  be  noted  how 
the  variability  between  countries  is 
higher  than  the  variability  within  for 
most of the variables. In particular this 
is the case for the public debt / GDP 
ratio,  population  density,  population 
over  65,  public  expenditure  and 
balance of payment (current account).  
Only  the  FDI  inflow  variable  has  a 
higher variability within than between.  
 
 
Table 9.1 Xtsum output 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Std.dev  Min  Max  Observations 
Debt  overall  49.38702  33.73324  4.922  180.783  N  190 
   between     33.59361  7.967  143.3626  n  19 
   within     7.946095  3.06742  86.80743  T  10 
Pop. gr.  overall  0.546461  0.574291  -0.53631  2.38548  N  190 
   between     0.544407  -0.22496  1.766302  n  19 
   within     0.218046  -0.3089  1.289821  T  10 
Pop. d.  overall  136.2184  117.5986  2.463585  504.4728  N  190 
   between     120.4645  2.61419  492.2646  n  19 
   within     2.962915  116.1203  148.4266  T  10 
Pop. 65  overall  14.93793  2.93012  7.002876  21.46098  N  190 
   between     2.930766  8.689578  19.15839  n  19 
   within     0.636579  12.51406  17.34756  T  10 
Expend.  overall  18.98063  3.735148  10.36898  27.25471  N  190 
   between     3.755158  11.32281  26.33374  n  19 
   within     0.722227  16.8888  21.91275  T  10 
Fdi in.  overall  3.715739  4.694854  -14.9221  26.438  N  190 
   between     2.280929  0.20103  7.2893  n  19 
   within     4.133613  -18.445  22.91517  T  10 
Fdi out.  overall  3.312812  3.669024  -4.87319  19.391  N  190 
   between     2.923631  0.254578  10.6255  n  19 
   within     2.306761  -6.05827  13.65827  T  10 
Cur. acc.  overall  -1.55666  5.605859  -14.6876  14.43558  N  190 
   between     5.387309  -9.60403  10.32891  n  19 
   within     1.945408  -10.1731  2.922195  T  10 
GDP gr.  overall  3.049816  2.218376  -2.1  11.1  N  190 
   between     1.395501  1.089519  5.56  n  19 
   within     1.751144  -4.61018  8.589816  T  10 
Inflation  overall  2.877011  2.060009  -0.89987  12.03578  N  190 
   between     1.616552  -0.15426  6.708207  n  19 
   within     1.324702  -0.7852  8.924667  T  10 43 
 
9.b  Dependent variable: the public debt / GDP ratio 
The dependent variable is the debt-to-GDP ratio, expressed as a percentage. The debt-GDP ratio is the 
most important indicator of the health of an economy .  
The data is from the oecd dataset. The oecd website gives the following definition of the debt-to-GDP ratio: 
“It is calculated as the total debt amount in a country as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
With a low ratio the economy probably produces a large number of goods and services which allow the 
government to pay back debts. The coverage of the data is limited to central government debt issuance and 
therefore excludes state and local government debt and social security funds.” 
Graph 9.1 gives a general idea of how the public debt / GDP ratio changes within countries over a longer 
period of time compared to the data used for regressions. 
The same time period will also apply to the other independent variables (except in the case of FDI outflow). 
 
Graph 9.1 The public debt / GDP ratio over time by country 
The graph shows the time series of the public debt / GDP ratio from 1993 to 2008 for each country. 
It can be noted that there is a clear-cut change in trend for most countries around 1996-97. This feature 
may  be  due  to  the  introduction  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  It  was  in  Maastricht  that  some  economic 
parameters were established, which future member states would have to respect in order to join the 
European Union. 
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The aim of the above-mentioned treaty, also known as European Union treaty, was to lead the different 
economies of the various countries towards a common economy. It is the treaty with which the first  
members of European Union fixed both politics and economic rules to enter in that Union. 
In order to enter in the European community a country have to be in line with five main points:  
1.  Public debt/GDP has to be smaller than 60% (it was made an exception for Italy and Belgium, in fact 
when they entered were higher than this threshold).  
2.  Public deficit/GDP has to be smaller than 3% 
3.  The inflation must not exceed by 1.5% that of the three state members which have the best results 
for price stability in the year prior to the examination of the state member’s situation. 
4.  Long term interest rate smaller than 2% with respect to the three best country in economic term. 
5.  To join, for two consecutive years, in the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) under the European 
Monetary System and without devaluation of its currency in this time period. 
Afterwards, we will analyse these last two variables and we will see their behaviour over time on the 
graphs, so as to note how this treaty affected the trend. 
On observing graph 9.1 we can state that Japan clearly has the highest public debt / GDP ratio of all the 
countries examined. Greece is in second place and Italy third. Japan also had the highest growth in the time 
period analysed, rising from approximately 50% in 1993 to 180% in 2008. 
Other countries, such as Czech Republic, France, Korea, Portugal Switzerland and Germany showed a rising 
trend in the public debt / GDP ratio, but they were all around a maximum of 20 percentage points. 
After adopting the Maastricht treaty, Italy seemed to show a decreasing trend in its public debt / GDP ratio, 
although the level is still high today. Other countries, such as Australia Canada Denmark Ireland Spain 
Poland and Sweden have shown a decreasing trend in their public debt / GDP ratio during the time period 
analysed.  
Greece seems to be an interesting case as, in the last few years, it has had a seesaw trend  
Spain seems to have suffered from the 2008 crisis more than other countries. Indeed, up to 2007, as can be 
seen in the previous graph, the level of the public debt / GDP ratio showed a decreasing trend up to the 
point that it reached a level equal to about 30% in 2007. In 2012 it reached 84.1%. 
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9.c  Independent variables 
 
 Inflation 
 
The data regarding inflation rates comes from the oecd dataset. The oecd website gives the following 
definition: 
 “Inflation is a rise in the general level of prices of goods and services that households acquire for the 
purpose of consumption in an economy over a period of time. The main measure of inflation is the annual 
inflation rate which is the movement of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from one month/period to the 
same month/period of the previous year expressed as percentage over time.” 
In our dataset inflation is measured as the percentage difference from the previous year. 
Graph 9.2 shows inflation over time from 1993 to 2008. As previously stated, inflation must not exceed by 
1.5% that of the three state members which have the best results for price stability in the year prior to the 
examination of the state member’s situation. Observing the graphs we can understand that the countries 
which had a lower inflation level (around 0.5%) in 1999 are Germany and France. 
 
Graph 9.2 Inflation rate over time. 
It can be seen how some countries which adopted the single currency in 1999, such as Ireland,  Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, did their best to reach a low level of inflation.  It also shows Greece, which adopted the 
single currency in  2001.  
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Graph 9.3 shows the relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio and the inflation rate over time 
 
Graph 9.3 Public debt over inflation, by year (within countries). 
The relationship between the public debt / GDP  ratio and inflation does not seem to be similar for all the 
countries,  but  rather  different.  It 
therefore seems inappropriate to use 
one regression model only, which is 
applicable  to  all  the  different 
countries. To get an idea of where all 
the individual countries in graph 9.3 
would be placed in one graph only, 
the  average  of  the  debt  and  the 
average  of  the  inflation  was 
calculated for each country. 
This  graph  thus  helps  us  to 
understand  whether  it  is  right  to 
apply  a  linear  regression  and 
presume the slope of the regression 
line. 
Graph 9.4 Public debt over inflation, means over time (between countries).    In  this  case  we  can  imagine  a 
negative  regression  line  between  the  means,  while  the  same  is  not  true  for  the  within  variability. 
Afterwards we will run three regressions in order to compare our expectations with the results actually 
obtained from the three different estimation methods. 
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The outputs of the single regressions using the three estimation methods (see panel data chapter) are 
reported below: 
 
reg debt   inflation 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =   10.26 
       Model |  11126.0061     1  11126.0061           Prob > F      =  0.0016 
    Residual |  203943.086   188  1084.80365           R-squared     =  0.0517 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0467 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  32.936 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   inflation |  -3.724514   1.162989    -3.20   0.002    -6.018699    -1.43033 
       _cons |   60.10249   4.111539    14.62   0.000     51.99181    68.21317 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.2 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – inflation  
 
xtreg debt    inflation,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0017                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0884                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0517                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      0.42 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.5164 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   inflation |  -.2973628   .4582108    -0.65   0.516     -1.19544    .6007139 
       _cons |   50.24254   7.695651     6.53   0.000     35.15934    65.32574 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  32.897881 
     sigma_e |  8.3714659 
         rho |    .939184   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.3 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – inflation, RE 
 
xtreg debt   inflation,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0017                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0884                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0517                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(1,170)           =      0.28 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2195                         Prob > F           =    0.5967 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   inflation |  -.2436964   .4596767    -0.53   0.597    -1.151106    .6637131 
       _cons |   50.08814   1.455281    34.42   0.000     47.21539    52.96089 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.478594 
     sigma_e |  8.3714659 
         rho |  .94115242   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   152.23             Prob > F = 0.0000 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.4 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – inflation, FE 48 
 
Observing the estimation values of the coefficients - as expected – since the variability of the individual 
effects    
  is much higher than   
 , it can be noted that   ̂       ̂   (see Chapter 7.b). The pooled OLS 
estimation is however different, due to the correlation of the inflation variable with the fixed effects that 
were not considered in the regression . 
From the single regressions it seems that the inflation variable is not statistically significant in explaining 
our dependent variable using both random and fixed effects methods, but seems to be significant using the 
OLS pooling method, confirming the evidence from Graph 9.4. 
Because there  are  different  thoughts on  how  inflation  influences  public  debt,  it  will  be  interesting  to 
discover how inflation, in our range time, affects the public debt/GDP ratio in the regression where all the 
variables are jointly estimated. In fact, on the one hand, some economists think that inflation can decrease 
the public debt/GDP ratio because higher prices lead to a higher GDP. On the other hand, some economists 
say that inflation is not a good solution because if there is an increase in inflation, there will also be an 
increase in the interest on the public debt.  
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 Balance of payments: current account 
The oecd website gives the following definition of this variable: 
“The current account includes all the transactions (other than those in financial items) that involve 
economic values and occur between resident and non- residents entities. The balance of payments 
is  a  statistical  statement  that  provides  a  systematic  summary  of  economic  transactions  of  an 
economy with the rest of the world, for a specific time period. The transactions are for the most 
part between residents and non-residents of the economy. The transactions included comprise: 
goods, services, and income; those involving financial claims on and liabilities to the rest of the 
world;  and  transfers.  A  transaction  is  defined  as  an  economic  flow  that  reflects  the  creation, 
transformation,  exchange,  transfer,  or  extinction  of  economic  value  and  involves  changes  in 
ownership, of goods or assets, the provision of services, labour or capital.” 
This variable is thus measured as a percentage of the GDP. 
 
Graph 9.5 Balance of payments over time 
 
It can be seen that all the countries which chose to adopt the single currency, in the period between 1998-
99, tried to reach a deficit no higher than 3%. 
Graph 9.6 shows the relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio and the balance of payments.  
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Graph 9.6 Public debt over current account balance, by year (within countries). 
Since the current account balance (as % of GDP) is the sum of the net exports of goods, services, net 
income, and net current transfers; it is expected that a negative balance account will increase the public 
debt/GDP  ratio.  Observing  graph  9.6  we  cannot  state  this,  since  a  common  relationship  between  all 
countries  is  not  clearly  defined.  
Looking also at graph 9.7, it seems 
that  there  is  not  a  clearly 
relationsip  between  Balance  of 
payments  and  the  public  debt  / 
GDP  ratio.  We  are  going  to  see 
with the following regressions, the 
different  coefficient  estimation 
obtained  with    the  three  usual 
model.  
 
 
 
Graph 9.7 Public debt over current account balance, means over time (between countries). 
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The single regressions are:  
reg debt curacc 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =    0.43 
       Model |  495.555804     1  495.555804           Prob > F      =  0.5107 
    Residual |  214573.537   188   1141.3486           R-squared     =  0.0023 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0030 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  33.784 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      curacc |  -.2888505   .4383652    -0.66   0.511    -1.153597    .5758961 
       _cons |   48.93738   2.544159    19.24   0.000     43.91861    53.95615 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.5 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – balance of payments 
 
xtreg debt curacc,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0090                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0037                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0023                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      1.36 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.2441 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      curacc |   .3550312   .3048034     1.16   0.244    -.2423725    .9524349 
       _cons |   49.93968   7.913889     6.31   0.000     34.42875    65.45062 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  34.401888 
     sigma_e |  8.3407971 
         rho |  .94448074   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.6 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – balance of payments, RE 
 
xtreg debt   curacc,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0090                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0037                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0023                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(1,170)           =      1.54 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1148                        Prob > F           =    0.2170 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      curacc |   .3864594   .3118644     1.24   0.217    -.2291662    1.002085 
       _cons |    49.9886   .7757761    64.44   0.000     48.45721       51.52 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.784897 
     sigma_e |  8.3407971 
         rho |  .94255196   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   161.91             Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.7 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – balance of payments, FE 
 52 
 
Considering the previous estimates, this variable seems not to have a significant  impact on the public debt 
/GDP ratio.  
Observing the estimation values of the coefficients, it can be understood that   ̂       ̂  . The pooled OLS 
estimation is however different, surely due to the correlation of the fixed effects that were not considered 
in the regression  and the balance of payments variable. Since the POLS model ignores the serial correlation 
in the composite error due to the presence of ci (see panel data chapter), the estimation obtained with this 
method  are  biased.  This  explains  the  differences  between  the  estimation  obtained  with  the  POLS  as 
opposed to the other two (RE and FE). 
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  Population over 65 years old 
 
The data pertinent to this population group has been taken from the World Bank website, which gives the 
following definition of this variable: 
 “Population aged 65 and above as a percentage of the total population. Population is based on the 
de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship 
-  except  for  refugees  not  permanently  settled  in  the  country  of  asylum,  who  are  generally 
considered part of the population of the country of origin.” 
Graph 9.8 shows the relationship between the population over 65 years old and the public debt / GDP ratio 
over time. 
 
Graph 9.8 Public debt over population over 65 years old, by year (within countries). 
The above graph is very similar to the one in which we have the debt in y and the time in x (see graph 9.1) 
This may be explained by a linear increase in the part of the population aged 65 and above over time. 
To discover this, the following graph has been created. It can be seen that as the years have passed, in 
many countries there has been a linear increase in the percentage over 65s in the population. 
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Graph 9.9 Population over 65 years old over time 
 
Observing the results from Sinha et al. (2011), the population variables seem not to influence the public 
debt/GDP  ratio.  This  fact  may  seem  strange.  One  country  with  a  large  number  of  people  over  65  
(retirement age) has a higher public expenditure and thus a bigger public debt than another country where 
fewer people get a pension. In fact the following graph (9.10) shows a clear positive relationship between  
public  debt  and  the  over  65  age 
range.  We  are  going  to  run  the 
usual three regressions in order to 
understand  how  the  different 
estimation  methods  treat  this 
relationship. 
Graph 9.10 Public debt over population over 65 years old, means over time (between countries). 
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The following shows whether the over 65 year old population variable has a significant relation in statistical 
terms on the public debt / GDP ratio. 
 
reg debt pop65 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =  163.70 
       Model |  100103.597     1  100103.597           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  114965.495   188  611.518592           R-squared     =  0.4654 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4626 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  24.729 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.854319   .6138872    12.79   0.000     6.643327    9.065312 
       _cons |  -67.94028   9.344046    -7.27   0.000    -86.37293   -49.50763 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.8 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population over 65 years old 
 
xtreg debt pop65,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2340                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.4803                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.4654                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     66.96 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   6.322063   .7725674     8.18   0.000     4.807859    7.836267 
       _cons |  -45.05154   12.87733    -3.50   0.000    -70.29063   -19.81244 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   24.81052 
     sigma_e |  7.3327825 
         rho |  .91966657   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.9 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population over 65 years old, RE 
 
xtreg debt pop65,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2340                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.4803                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.4654                                        max =        10 
  
                                               F(1,170)           =     51.94 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2194                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   6.038491   .8378873     7.21   0.000     4.384487    7.692494 
       _cons |  -40.81556   12.52761    -3.26   0.001    -65.54526   -16.08585 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  24.852341 
     sigma_e |  7.3327825 
         rho |  .91991508   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   109.34             Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.10 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population over 65 years old, FE 
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The three different estimation methods used seem to lead to estimations which are very similar the one to 
the othe. In all the three single regressions the over 65 variable seems to positively influence the public 
debt  / GDP.  
The  variability  of  the  individual  effects    
   is  much  higher  than    
 ,this  explains  why      ̂       ̂                    
(see section 7.b).  
The OLS estimation of the coefficient concerned seems to be in line with the values estimated with FE and 
RE , thus it seems less biased than in previous covariates.  
It is important to note how the R
2 value for this variable is much higher than the R
2 values seen up to now.  
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  Density of population 
These data, as all those relative to the population, have been taken from the World Bank dataset, which 
gives the following definition: 
 “Population density is mid-year population divided by land area in square kilometres. Population is 
based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status 
or citizenship - except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. Land area is a country's total 
area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive 
economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland  water bodies includes major rivers and 
lakes.” 
Measurements will consider number of people per sq.km of land area. 
The graph below shows the relationship between the density of population and the public debt / GDP ratio 
over time. 
 
 
Graph 9.11 Public debt over density of population, by year (within countries). 
This graph seems to reflect the trend of debt over time in the majority of the countries considered. In fact, 
on  observing  the  graph  we  can  see  that,  in  most  cases,  the  density  of  population  also  increases  or 
decreases in a linear way over time.  
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Graph 9.12 Population density over time. 
Now we will see whether the density of population variable has a significant impact in statistical terms on 
the  public  debt  /  GDP  ratio.  Graph  9.13  clearly  shows  a  positive  relationship  between  the  debt  and 
population density variable.  On the next page we are going to run the usual three regressions in order to 
understand  how  the  different 
estimation  methods  treat  this 
relationship. 
Graph 9.13 Public debt over population density, means over time (between countries). 
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reg debt popden 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =   14.42 
       Model |  15318.4205     1  15318.4205           Prob > F      =  0.0002 
    Residual |  199750.672   188  1062.50357           R-squared     =  0.0712 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0663 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  32.596 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      popden |    .076555   .0201619     3.80   0.000     .0367824    .1163277 
       _cons |   38.95882   3.624221    10.75   0.000     31.80945    46.10818 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.11 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population density 
 
xtreg debt popden,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0015                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0753                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0712                                        max =        10 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      1.63 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.2020 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      popden |   .0788981   .0618449     1.28   0.202    -.0423157     .200112 
       _cons |   38.63964   11.34983     3.40   0.001     16.39438    60.88491 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   33.13447 
     sigma_e |  8.3722658 
         rho |  .93998668   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.12 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population density, RE 
 
xtreg debt popden,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0015                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0753                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0712                                        max =        10 
                                                F(1,170)           =      0.25 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0962                        Prob > F           =    0.6188 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      popden |   .1024641   .2055384     0.50   0.619    -.3032722    .5082003 
       _cons |   35.42953    28.0047     1.27   0.208    -19.85221    90.71127 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  32.454165 
     sigma_e |  8.3722658 
         rho |  .93760294   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   148.87             Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.13 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population density, FE 
 
Observing the three estimates obtained using the usual three estimation methods, it can be stated that a 
growth in population density leads to a growth of the public debt / GDP ratio. However, looking at the 
pvalue we can realize that the estimation obtained using POLS is significant, but those obtained with FE and 
RE are not significant for the public debt. As the POLS estimation is biased, it is plausible to state that the 
population density is not statistically significant in explaining the public debt / GDP ratio. This is due to the 
different behaviors observed in Graph 9.11 60 
 
  Population growth  
The data relative to this variable have been taken from the World Bank website, which gives the following 
definition:  
“Population growth rate (PGR) is the increase in a country’s population during a period of time, 
usually one year, expressed as a percentage of the population at the start of that period. It reflects 
the number of births and deaths during the period and the number of people migrating to and from 
a country.” 
As  usual,  we  can  see  a  graph  in  which  the  relationship  between  this  explanatory  variable  and  the 
dependent variable over time is shown. 
 
Graph 9.14 Public debt over population growth rate, by year (within countries). 
Here (graph 9.14) it seems complicated to see on a graph how the relationship between the two variables is 
similar for each country. In some countries, such as Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada, we cannot 
state that an increase (or a decrease) in the growth rate of the population leads to a diminution (or an 
augmentation) in the public debt / GDP ratio.  Indeed, looking at Graph 9.15 it is plausible to state a 
negative relationship between population growth and public debt. 
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Graph 9.15 Public debt over population growth, means over time (between countries). 
We will now see whether the population growth variable is statistically significant in explaining the public 
debt / GDP ratio.  
reg debt popgrowth 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =   23.37 
       Model |  23782.0743     1  23782.0743           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  191287.018   188  1017.48414           R-squared     =  0.1106 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1058 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  31.898 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   -19.5327   4.040184    -4.83   0.000    -27.50262   -11.56278 
       _cons |   60.06088    3.19837    18.78   0.000     53.75157    66.37018 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.14 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population growth 
 
xtreg debt popgrowth,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1043                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.1141                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.1106                                        max =        10 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     21.65 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -12.07736   2.595665    -4.65   0.000    -17.16477   -6.989951 
       _cons |   55.98683    7.58624     7.38   0.000     41.11807    70.85558 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  32.439636 
     sigma_e |  7.9294922 
         rho |  .94361867   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.15 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population growth, RE 
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xtreg debt popgrowth,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1043                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.1141                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.1106                                        max =        10 
                                                F(1,170)           =     19.79 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1428                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -11.76835   2.645254    -4.45   0.000    -16.99012   -6.546575 
       _cons |   55.81796    1.55579    35.88   0.000     52.74681    58.88912 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  32.003105 
     sigma_e |  7.9294922 
         rho |  .94215964   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   159.57             Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.16 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population growth, FE 
 
Population growth also seems to have a significant impact in statistical terms on the public debt / GDP 
ratio. However, since the POLS give us biased estimation, it is better to consider estimations obtained with 
FE and RE model. Those estimates are similar to each other because variability of the individual effects   
  is 
much higher than   
  (see panel data chapter). Thus a negative relation seems to be confirmed by all 
estimates. 
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  Public expenditure 
 
The  data  relative  to  this  variable  have  been  taken  from  the  oecd  website,  which  gives  the  following 
definition: 
 “Public expenditure refers to spending of public authorities at all levels. Expenditure that is not 
directly related to education (e.g., culture, sports, youth activities, etc.) is, in principle, not included. 
Expenditure on education by other ministries or equivalent institutions, for example Health and 
Agriculture, is included.” 
As usual, we will see the graph showing the relationship between the public expenditure variable and the 
public debt / GDP ratio over time. 
 
Graph 9.16 Public debt over public expenditure, by year (within countries).. 
From the graph 9.16 we are unable to state a valid general rule, as was expected from previous studies.  
As far as countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Ireland, Greece and 
Canada  are  concerned,  it  seems  we  can  expect  (or  perceive  by  intuition)  that  an  increase  in  public 
expenditure will lead to an increase in the public debt / GDP ratio.  
However, for other important countries as Italy, Frence or Germany, we cannot make the same affirmation. 
This can be explained by the Keynesian theory which sustains that an increase in public expenditure is to be 
considered as an action that will be carried out to motivate the economy in periods of recession, and 
therefore lower the public debt / GDP ratio in the long term. Indeed, observing graph 9.17 a relationship 
between these two variables is not clear, wherease for the other variables analysed so far  it is clear. 
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From  the  adjacent  graph  a  positive 
relationship between public debt / GDP 
ratio  and  public  expenditure  seems  to 
be  present.  In  the  following  it  will  be 
shown  how  the  different  estimation 
methods  treat  this  relationship. 
Graph 9.17 Public debt over public expenditure, means over time (between countries). 
 
reg debt expend 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =    3.65 
       Model |  4096.95712     1  4096.95712           Prob > F      =  0.0576 
    Residual |  210972.135   188  1122.19221           R-squared     =  0.0190 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0138 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  33.499 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      expend |   1.246499   .6523713     1.91   0.058    -.0404095    2.533408 
       _cons |   25.72769   12.61866     2.04   0.043     .8353358    50.62004 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.17 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – public expenditure 
 
 
 
xtreg debt expend,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0279                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0187                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0190                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      5.15 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0232 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      expend |   1.757144   .7739646     2.27   0.023     .2402011    3.274087 
       _cons |   16.03533   16.64977     0.96   0.335    -16.59761    48.66827 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  34.142909 
     sigma_e |    8.26076 
         rho |  .94469907   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.18 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population growth, RE 
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xtreg debt expend,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0279                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0187                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0190                                        max =        10 
                                                F(1,170)           =      4.88 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0678                        Prob > F           =    0.0286 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      expend |   1.837095   .8319848     2.21   0.029     .1947434    3.479447 
       _cons |    14.5178   15.80296     0.92   0.360    -16.67751    45.71311 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.357577 
     sigma_e |    8.26076 
         rho |  .94221677   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   162.31             Prob > F = 0.0000 
Table 9.19 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – population growth, FE 
 
From the output of the single regressions we can thus state that the variables seem to explain a small part 
of the public debt / GDP ratio. It is possible to state, from the three estimation methods, that there is a 
positive relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio and public expenditure, but it is clearer by using 
the within variability.  
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  Foreign direct investment 
These  values  have  also  been  taken  from  the  dataset  of  the  oecd  website,  which  gives  the  following 
definition:  
 “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key element in international economic integration. FDI creates 
direct, stable and long-lasting links between economies. It encourages the transfer of technology 
and know-how between countries, and allows the host economy to promote its products more 
widely in international markets. FDI is also an additional source of funding for investment and, 
under the right policy environment, it can be an important vehicle for enterprise development.” 
In our dataset we divided the FDI between FDI inward and FDI outward: 
“Inward stocks refer to all direct investments held by non-residents in the reporting economy; 
outward stocks are the investments of the reporting economy held abroad. Corresponding flows 
relate to investment during a period of time. Negative flows generally indicate disinvestments or 
the  impact  of  substantial  reimbursements  of  inter-company  loans.  The  FDI  index  gauges  the 
restrictiveness of a country's FDI rules through four types of restrictions: foreign equity limitations; 
screening  or  approval  mechanisms;  restriction  on  key  foreign  employment;  operational 
restrictions.” 
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  Foreign direct investment (inflow) 
As usual, we will see the graph showing the relationship between FDI (inflow) and the public debt / GDP 
ratio.  
 
Graph 9.18 Public debt over FDI inflow, by year (within countries). 
From the previous studies we expect the Foreign Direct Investment variable, net inflows (% of GDP), to 
affect public debt negatively. This means that we conjecture that an increase in the net inflows decreases 
the public debt/GDP ratio. However, from the above graph (9.18), we are not able to identify a similar 
relationship  between  these  two 
variables for all the countries. Thus, we 
cannot  understand  whether  there  is  a 
relationship  that  allows  us  to  declare 
that public debt increases or decreases 
when FDI inflow increases. From graph 
9.19 the relationship between these two 
variables seems to be negative. On the 
next page we will now see the  simple 
regressions of FDI inflow on the public 
debt / DGP ratio. 
 
 
Graph 9.19 Public debt over FDI inflow , means over time (between countries). 
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reg debt fdiinoecd 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =    8.67 
       Model |  9481.50746     1  9481.50746           Prob > F      =  0.0036 
    Residual |  205587.585   188  1093.55098           R-squared     =  0.0441 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0390 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  33.069 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   fdiinoecd |   -1.50864   .5123498    -2.94   0.004    -2.519334   -.4979471 
       _cons |   54.99273    3.06265    17.96   0.000     48.95116    61.03431 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.20 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – FDI inflows 
 
xtreg debt fdiinoecd,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0265                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.2798                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0441                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      3.97 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0462 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   fdiinoecd |   .2943637   .1476497     1.99   0.046     .0049756    .5837518 
       _cons |   48.29324   6.860891     7.04   0.000     34.84614    61.74034 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  29.219096 
     sigma_e |  8.2665879 
         rho |  .92588974   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.21 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – FDI inflows, RE 
 
xtreg debt fdiinoecd,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0265                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.2798                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0441                                        max =        10 
                                                F(1,170)           =      4.63 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2579                        Prob > F           =    0.0328 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   fdiinoecd |   .3129803   .1454674     2.15   0.033     .0258253    .6001353 
       _cons |   48.22407   .8073575    59.73   0.000     46.63033    49.81781 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.976626 
     sigma_e |  8.2665879 
         rho |  .94411236   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   157.69             Prob > F = 0.0000 
Table 9.22 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – FDI inflows, FE 
 
The FDI inflow variable alone also seems to explain the public debt / GDP ratio, in fact the three coefficient 
estimates obtained are all statistically significant. Observing the estimation values of the coefficients it can 
be noted that   ̂       ̂   , because of the variability of the individual effects    
  is much higher than   
  
(see section 7.b). The pooled value of OLS estimates is different, the sign even changes, meaning that when 
the FE and RE model is used the FDI inflow has a positive effect on the public debt / GDP ratio. On the other 
hand, using the POLS this impact is negative. This fact is due to the correlation of the fixed effects that were 
not considered in the regression. 69 
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  Foreign direct investment (outflow) 
 
The following graph shows the relationship between public debt and FDI outflow. 
 
Graph 9.20 Public debt over FDI outflow, by year (within countries). 
 
Obviously, we expect that an increase in the net outflows positively affects the public debt/GDP ratio. An 
increase of these net outflows causes an increase in the public debt.  
However, in the above graph a common relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio for all the 
countries analysed cannot be found, 
while a negative relationship emerges 
from graph 9.21. On the next page it 
will  be  shown  how  the  different 
estimation  methods  treat  this 
relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 9.21 Public debt over FDI outflow, means over time (between countries). 
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The following shows the output of the single regressions between the public debt / GDP ratio and FDI 
outflow. 
 
reg debt fdioutoecd 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =    5.30 
       Model |   5901.9614     1   5901.9614           Prob > F      =  0.0224 
    Residual |  209167.131   188  1112.59112           R-squared     =  0.0274 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0223 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  33.356 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdioutoecd |  -1.523059   .6612815    -2.30   0.022    -2.827544   -.2185738 
       _cons |   54.43263   3.264187    16.68   0.000     47.99349    60.87177 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.23 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – FDI outflows 
 
xtreg debt fdioutoecd,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0058                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0548                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0274                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      0.80 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.3712 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdioutoecd |   .2345944    .262316     0.89   0.371    -.2795355    .7487243 
       _cons |   48.60985    7.76236     6.26   0.000     33.39591     63.8238 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.502905 
     sigma_e |  8.3540687 
         rho |   .9414625   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.24 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – FDI outflows, RE 
 
xtreg debt fdioutoecd,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0058                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0548                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0274                                        max =        10 
                                                F(1,170)           =      0.99 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1987                        Prob > F           =    0.3209 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdioutoecd |   .2622422   .2634295     1.00   0.321    -.2577721    .7822565 
       _cons |   48.51826   1.062502    45.66   0.000     46.42087    50.61566 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.781331 
     sigma_e |  8.3540687 
         rho |  .94236807   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   157.06             Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.25 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – FDI outflows, FE 
 
After observing the outputs from the FE and RE methods we can state that the FDI outflow variable does 
not seem to explain the public debt / GDP ratio.  As known the estimates obtained with POLS methods is 
surely biased and counter intuitive. 71 
 
 
 GDP growth rate 
This data is taken from the oecd website, which gives the following definition: 
 “Gross domestic product is an aggregate measure of production equal to the sum of the gross 
values added of all resident institutional units engaged in production (plus any taxes, and minus any 
subsidies, on products not included in the value of their outputs). The sum of the final uses of 
goods and services (all uses except intermediate consumption) measured in purchasers' prices, less 
the value of imports of goods and services, or the sum of primary incomes distributed by resident 
producer units.”  
The GDP growth is calculated as the percentage difference compared to the previous year.  
The following graph shows the relationship between the public debt /GDP ratio and the GDP growth rate 
over time.  
  
Graph 9.22 Public debt over GDP growth rate, by year (within countries). 
It is natural to think that an increase on the variable GDP growth rate reduces the public debt/GDP ratio.  
However, it does not seem possible to state this after observing the graphs for each country. Indeed, it 
seems possible to state that by looking at graph 9.23. 
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Graph 9.23 Public debt over GDP growth rate, means over time (between countries). 
 
The outputs of single regressions are shown below: 
reg debt gdpgrow 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   188) =   14.70 
       Model |  15593.9493     1  15593.9493           Prob > F      =  0.0002 
    Residual |  199475.143   188    1061.038           R-squared     =  0.0725 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0676 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  32.574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgrow |  -4.094604   1.068069    -3.83   0.000    -6.201544   -1.987664 
       _cons |   61.87481    4.02432    15.38   0.000     53.93618    69.81343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.26 Output of the regression public debt / GDP - GDPgrowth rate. 
 
 
xtreg debt gdpgrow,re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0097                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.2323                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0725                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      1.25 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.2635 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgrow |    .390963   .3496771     1.12   0.264    -.2943916    1.076318 
       _cons |   48.19466   7.112026     6.78   0.000     34.25534    62.13397 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  30.173095 
     sigma_e |  8.3378272 
         rho |  .92905717   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 9.27 Output of the regression public debt / GDP - GDP growth rate , RE 
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xtreg debt gdpgrow,fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0097                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.2323                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0725                                        max =        10 
                                                F(1,170)           =      1.66 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3045                        Prob > F           =    0.1996 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgrow |    .445931    .346338     1.29   0.200    -.2377459    1.129608 
       _cons |   48.02701   1.217206    39.46   0.000     45.62423     50.4298 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  33.897913 
     sigma_e |  8.3378272 
         rho |  .94295088   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 170) =   149.96             Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9.28 Output of the regression public debt / GDP – GDP growth rate, FE 
 
The GDP growth rate does not seem to affect the public debt / GDP ratio negatively. When the GDP growth 
rate rises, it is possible to think that the public debt/ GDP ratio will decrease. The FE and RE estimations do 
not however seem to be statistically significant and the sign of the coefficient is not as expected. It will be 
interesting to see whether this variable becomes significant in the model we will estimate with multiple 
regressions.  
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9.d  Summary of the preliminary analysis 
We will now summarize what has been discovered in the above preliminary analysis. 
We  created  the  following  table  showing  the  results  of  the  simple  regressions  carried  out  in  terms  of 
significance of the parameters.   
 
In this table (n) stands for a non-significant 
variable. 
“?”  stands  for  an  unclear  relationship 
between the independent variable and the 
public debt/GDP ratio. 
The plus and minus signs show the slope 
of the regression line. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 9.29 Results of all the single regressions. 
 
As far as the relationship between the independent variables and the public debt / GDP ratio is concerned, 
we can make the following summary: 
  POPULATION OVER 65: there is a linear relationship between the population over 65 and the public 
debt  /  GDP  variable  for  most  of  the  countries  analysed.  In  the  majority  of  the  cases,  the 
relationship seems to be positive (for 12 countries), whereas for another 5 countries (including 
Italy) it is negative. A relationship between population over 65 and the public debt / GDP ratio can 
be noted observing both the between and within variability (positive). (see graphs 9.8 and 9.10) 
  DENSITY OF POPULATION: here there also seems to be a more or less linear relationship, as there is 
for the population over 65. (see graphs 9.11 and 9.13) 
  POPULATION GROWTH: there seems to be a linear relationship common to most of the countries 
observed:  an  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  the  population  leads  to  a  decrease  in  the  public        
debt  /  GDP  ratio  in  12  countries,  and  an  increase  in  the  other  5  countries;  using  between 
information a more clear relationship between public debt/GDP and population growth can be 
notedt. From the between variability a negative relationship emerged. (see graphs 9.14 and 9.15) 
  PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: there is a clear positive relationship between the public expenditure variable 
and the public debt / GDP ratio using the within variability. This relationship cannot to be observed 
using the between variability; (see graphs 9.16 and 9.17) 
  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (INFLOW): there seems to be no relationship between the public 
debt  /  GDP  ratio  and  FDI  inflow  variables;  a  negative  relationship  can  be  observed  using  the 
between variability. (see graphs 9.18 and 9.19)  
  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (OUTFLOW): there seems to be no common relationship between 
FDI outflow  and the public debt / GDP ratio for all the countries analysed; a negative relationship 
emerged observing the between information. (see graphs 9.20 and 9.21) 
  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: there seems to be no relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio 
observing both within and between information. (see graphs 9.5 and 9.6) 
variables  Simple regressions 
   ols   re  fe  expected 
Population over 65  +  +  +  + 
population density  +  (n) +  (n)  +  ? 
population growth  ─  ─  ─  ─ 
expenditure  (n) +  +  +  + 
FDI in (oecd)  ─  +  +  ─ 
FDI out(oecd)  ─  (n) +  (n)  +  + 
Balance of payments (oecd)  (n) ─  (n) +  (n)  +  ─ 
GDP growth  ─  (n) +  (n)  +  ─ 
inflation  ─  (n) ─  (n) ─  ? 75 
 
  GDP GROWTH RATE: it is not possible to highlight a common linear relationship between the public 
debt / GDP ratio and GDP growth  rate in most of the countries analysed. Using the between 
information it is possible to see a negative relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio and the 
GDP growth rate . (see graphs 9.22 and 9.23) 
  INFLATION : there does not seem to be a relationship between the public debt / GDP ratio and the 
inflation  rate  for  the  within  variability,  while  it  seems  to  exist  for  the  between 
information(negative). (see graphs 9.2 and 9.3) 
These above observations, coming from the graphs, do not always correspond with the results obtained in 
the simple regressions summarized in table 9.29 . 
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10.  Econometric model 
As  carried  out  previously,  we  will  try  to  create  three  different  models  in  order  to  explain  the                   
public debt / GDP ratio, using the three different methods explained in the panel data chapter. 
 
10.a   Pooled OLS model 
 
Using the following command in Stata, we obtained the results set out below:  
 
reg debt pop65 popden popgrowth expend fdiinoecd fdioutoecd curaccoecd gdpgrow 
inflation, robust 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     190 
                                                       F(  9,   180) =   30.26 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6129 
                                                       Root MSE      =  21.507 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   8.605045   .8943621     9.62   0.000     6.840262    10.36983 
      popden |   .0790408   .0158357     4.99   0.000     .0477933    .1102883 
   popgrowth |  -1.563786   3.088904    -0.51   0.613    -7.658907    4.531334 
      expend |  -.2362898   .3996968    -0.59   0.555    -1.024984    .5524042 
   fdiinoecd |  -.0501376   .4101978    -0.12   0.903    -.8595525    .7592773 
  fdioutoecd |  -1.358355    .554251    -2.45   0.015     -2.45202   -.2646901 
  curaccoecd |   -1.01143   .3840255    -2.63   0.009    -1.769201   -.2536588 
     gdpgrow |   1.243748   .8505371     1.46   0.145    -.4345582    2.922054 
   inflation |  -.8761197   .8285954    -1.06   0.292     -2.51113    .7588902 
       _cons |  -82.74268   15.30741    -5.41   0.000    -112.9477   -52.53763 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 10.1 Output of the multiple regression on public debt / GDP with all variable, POLS 
 
Eliminating the non-significant variables at a 5% level, we obtained the following estimated model 
 
reg debt pop65 popden fdioutoecd curaccoecd, robust 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     190 
                                                       F(  4,   185) =   56.21 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6044 
                                                       Root MSE      =  21.444 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   8.318302   .6627401    12.55   0.000     7.010802    9.625802 
      popden |   .0865824   .0137512     6.30   0.000     .0594532    .1137117 
  fdioutoecd |  -1.294725   .5026329    -2.58   0.011    -2.286354   -.3030953 
  curaccoecd |  -.9530034    .322357    -2.96   0.004    -1.588972    -.317035 
       _cons |  -83.85967   10.03228    -8.36   0.000     -103.652   -64.06728 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 10.2 Output of the multiple regression on public debt / GDP with only significant variables,  POLS 
 
The following is the model obtained using the pooled OLS method: 
(10.1) 
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10.b  Fixed effects method 
Estimating the model for the public debt / GDP ratio in Stata using the fixed effects method, we obtained 
the following output: 
xtreg debt pop65 popden popgrowth expend fdiin fdiout curacc gdpgrow infl, fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4243                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0027                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0017                                        max =        10 
                                                F(9,162)           =     13.27 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9320                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.262538   .8991022     8.08   0.000     5.487067    9.038009 
      popden |  -.6515275   .2275663    -2.86   0.005    -1.100906   -.2021488 
   popgrowth |  -9.733813   2.341221    -4.16   0.000    -14.35706   -5.110568 
      expend |   2.665998   .8467599     3.15   0.002      .993888    4.338108 
       fdiin |   .1708323    .131241     1.30   0.195    -.0883315     .429996 
      fdiout |   .0399842   .2196386     0.18   0.856    -.3937396    .4737079 
      curacc |  -.2297955   .2787048    -0.82   0.411    -.7801583    .3205674 
     gdpgrow |   .8048876   .3624146     2.22   0.028     .0892217    1.520553 
        infl |   .3004342    .403143     0.75   0.457    -.4956587    1.096527 
       _cons |  -20.07748   26.90006    -0.75   0.457    -73.19745     33.0425 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   93.77147 
     sigma_e |  6.5120587 
         rho |  .99520039   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 162) =   100.08             Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 10.3 Output of the multiple regression on public debt / GDP with all variables, FE 
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Eliminating, as usual, the non-significant variables, we obtained the following:  
 
xtreg  debt pop65 popden popgrowth expend gdpgrow, fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4107                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0004                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0001                                        max =        10 
                                                F(5,166)           =     23.14 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9095                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.006687   .8561314     8.18   0.000     5.316377    8.696996 
      popden |  -.5571161   .2089698    -2.67   0.008    -.9696973   -.1445349 
   popgrowth |  -10.34044   2.242162    -4.61   0.000    -14.76727   -5.913607 
      expend |   2.486169    .813646     3.06   0.003     .8797405    4.092597 
     gdpgrow |   .8186932   .3217089     2.54   0.012     .1835248    1.453862 
       _cons |   -23.4242   25.13398    -0.93   0.353    -73.04766    26.19926 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  81.754856 
     sigma_e |  6.5087768 
         rho |  .99370164   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 166) =   116.56             Prob > F = 0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 10.4 Output of the multiple regression on public debt / GDP with only significant  variables, FE 
 
 
The following is the model obtained using the fixed effects method:  
(10.2)                    
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10.c Random effects method 
 
We obtained the following output using the random effects method:  
 
xtreg  debt pop65 popden popgrowth expend fdiinoecd fdioutoecd curaccoecd gdpgrow inflation, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3892                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.4800                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.4750                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    118.90 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   6.145646   .7589186     8.10   0.000     4.658193    7.633099 
      popden |   .0436237   .0510506     0.85   0.393    -.0564335     .143681 
   popgrowth |  -10.81526   2.317565    -4.67   0.000    -15.35761   -6.272919 
      expend |   1.486112   .7635251     1.95   0.052    -.0103698    2.982594 
      fdiino |   .1886551   .1333312     1.41   0.157    -.0726693    .4499796 
      fdiout |   -.039844   .2222789    -0.18   0.858    -.4755026    .3958145 
      curacc |  -.0058527   .2582497    -0.02   0.982    -.5120129    .5003074 
     gdpgrow |   .8320571   .3602543     2.31   0.021     .1259715    1.538143 
   inflation |   .0372168   .4009477     0.09   0.926    -.7486263    .8230599 
       _cons |  -73.87861   19.25633    -3.84   0.000    -111.6203   -36.13689 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  26.253336 
     sigma_e |  6.5120587 
         rho |  .94203892   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 10.5 Output of the multiple regression on public debt / GDP with all variables, RE 
 
Excluding the non-significant variables in the previous regression, we obtained the following:  
 
xtreg  debt pop65 popgrowth  gdpgrow, re 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3650                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.5009                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.4930                                        max =        10 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(3)       =    113.22 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   6.509979   .7213216     9.03   0.000     5.096215    7.923744 
   popgrowth |  -11.87043   2.189851    -5.42   0.000    -16.16246   -7.578401 
     gdpgrow |   .6028089   .2800535     2.15   0.031     .0539141    1.151704 
       _cons |  -43.21035   12.47351    -3.46   0.001    -67.65798   -18.76272 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  25.729341 
     sigma_e |  6.7156814 
         rho |  .93621777   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 10.6 Output of the multiple regression on public debt / GDP with only significant variables.RE 
 
The following is the model obtained using the random effects method: 
 
(10.3)     
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We then carried out the Hausman test (table10.7) to ascertain whether it was better to use the random 
effects or the fixed effects method. 
hausman fe re 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       fe           re         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |    7.262538     6.145646        1.116892        .4821071 
      popden |   -.6515275     .0436237       -.6951513        .2217662 
   popgrowth |   -9.733813    -10.81526        1.081449        .3319743 
      expend |    2.665998     1.486112        1.179886        .3661034 
   fdiinoecd |    .1708323     .1886551       -.0178229               . 
  fdioutoecd |    .0399842     -.039844        .0798282               . 
  curaccoecd |   -.2297955    -.0058527       -.2239427        .1048021 
     gdpgrow |    .8048876     .8320571       -.0271695        .0395116 
   inflation |    .3004342     .0372168        .2632174        .0420146 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       13.61 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.1369 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 10.7 Output of the Hausman test 
On observing the usual value for verifying the null hypothesis, we would be led to saying that the best 
model is the one obtained with RE. However, this test is not correct as, on observing the final column in the 
above table, we can see that two values are missing. This omission is due to the negative difference 
between the Var(FE) and Var(RE), which can never be negative as it is a variance.  
Remember that Hausman showed:     (    ̂       ̂ )       (    ̂ )             ̂. (see section 7.b) 
We can create single t-tests in order to observe parameter by parameter whether the best model  is FE or 
RE (using the (    ̂       ̂        ratio). The values resulting from the latter are all higher than 2 (excepting 
GDP growth rate), and so we can say that the best model to use is the Fixed effects one. For further details 
see the chapter on panel data.  
The final model is set out below (10.2):  
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10.d   Comments on the results 
Observing the previous model of the regression formed with all the variables together, it can be seen how 
some variables are no longer significant, whereas they were statistically significant in the single regressions 
in explaining the public debt / GDP ratio. 
In order to examine more closely what has just been stated, and to highlight the differences between the 
simple and multiple results in terms of their statistical significance, the following table has been created.  
 
Variables  Simple regression  Multiple regression 
   ols   re  fe  ols  re  fe 
Population 
over 65  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Population 
density  +  (n) +  (n)  +  +  (n) +  ─ 
Population 
growth  ─  ─  ─  (n) ─  ─  ─ 
Public 
expenditure  (n) +  +  +  (n) ─  (n) +  + 
FDI in  ─  +  +  (n) ─  (n) +  (n) + 
FDI out  ─  (n) +  (n)  +  ─  (n) ─  (n) + 
Balance of 
payments   (n) ─  (n) +  (n)  +  ─  (n) ─  (n) ─ 
GDP growth  ─  (n) +  (n)  +  (n) +  +  + 
Inflation  ─  (n) ─  (n) ─  (n) ─  (n) +  (n) + 
Table 10.8 Results of the simple and multiple regressions 
 
The fixed effects and random effects estimations always turned out to be in line in the simple regressions. 
This is because, as explained in the chapter on panel data, the RE estimator can be seen as a weighted 
average between the within transformation and the between transformation. The weight depends on the 
error variability due to individual effects, and on the variability of the idiosyncratic error. In our analysis we 
always obtained a much higher variability due to the individual effects than due to that of the idiosyncratic 
error. For this reason the results of the FE and RE estimations are more or less equal. 
Again focusing on simple regressions. There are variables where the coefficients estimated with the POLS 
models seem to have a negative impact on the public debt, while the impact seems to be positive when 
estimated with FE and RE. Examples of this are the GDP growth rate, balance of payments, FDI outflow and 
inflow variables.  
The differences between the estimations obtained with the POLS method and those of the FE and RE 
methods are due to the biased POLS estimations. The POLS model, in fact, does not consider the correlation 
in the composite error because of the presence of individual effects (ci).   
On observing the differences obtained between the results of the simple regressions with those obtained 
from multiple regressions it can be noted how some variables which, when considered individually have a 
negative effect on the public debt  / GDP ratio, yet when analysed all together, have a positive influence on 
that same ratio, or vice versa. 83 
 
The estimations obtained with the random effects method on  simple regression suggest there is a positive 
relationship between FDI outflows and the public debt / GDP ratio. If, however, they are analysed along 
with the other variables concerned, the relationship between them is negative.  
Looking at the balance of payments variable it can be noted how both the estimations obtained with RE 
and FE, if analysed separately, seem to have a positive influence on the public debt / GDP ratio. When they 
are  considered  with  all  the  other  variables,  they  express  a  negative  relationship  with  the  variable  in 
question. 
These two previous variables do not however result statistically significant in the final model (10.2). In fact, 
except for the population density variable, the variables in the model 10.2 show a valid relationship both 
when analysed individually and when analysed with the others.  The population density variable however, 
when estimated alone with the FE method, gives a positive impact on the ratio concerned; when analysed 
with all the other factors, a negative relationship between the two variables is implied. It should be noted 
how the estimation obtained with the FE method in the simple regression is statistically non-significant. 
It is also possible to discover differences between the FE and RE methods observing multiple regressions. 
For example population density variable seems to have a negative impact on the public debt / GDP ratio 
using RE, but this impact seems to be positive with FE. The opposite can be observed for the FDI outflows 
variable. However, these two latter variables are non-significant in the RE method. 
Lastly, considering only the differences obtained from the simple and multiple regressions in terms of their 
significance, other interesting results emerged. For example, when the FDI inflows and public expenditure 
variables are run in simple regressions, they are statistically significant on the public debt / GDP ratio, but 
are not so when run in multiple regressions. A plausible reason is the fact that other variables in the 
multiple regression explain the latter two variables. It is right to think, for example, that the GDP growth 
variable is correlated with the public expenditure variable.  
There  are  some  variables,  however,  which  seem  to  influence  the  public  debt  /  GDP  ratio  only  when 
associated with others. This is the case with the GDP growth rate.   
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10.e  Interpretation of the final model 
The final model (10.2 ) is reported below: 
    
   
                                                                                        
                                     
  The estimation of the factor relative to GDP growth seems to be a strange result. If there is a 1% 
growth  of  the  GDP  compared  to  the  previous  year,  the  model  suggests  an  increase  of 
approximately 0.81 percentage points of the public debt / GDP ratio. It may be due to an increase 
in public spending. 
  The result for the over 65s  is as we expected. Thus, if there is a population increase in the over 65s 
age range, we could be led to think that the public debt will increase. The model precisely suggests 
that with a 1% increase in the over 65s group, the debt increases by about 7 percentage points. 
This may explain Mario Monti’s recent pension reforms   
  It is plausible to think that with an increase in the population growth rate, the public debt / GDP 
ratio will decrease. In other words, a 1% rise in the total population compared to the previous year 
will lead to a diminution of the public debt / GDP ratio equal to 10.34 percentage points. 
  It seems that a population density increase may also contribute to a reduction of the public debt / 
GDP ratio, even if in a smaller measure compared to an increase in the population growth rate. 
From the estimated model it seems that an increase of ten people per sq.km decreases the public 
debt / GDP ratio by about 5.5 percentage points. 
  Finally, an increase in the percentage of public expenditure on the GDP by one percentage point 
leads to an increase of the public debt / GDP ratio equal to  about 2.5 percentage points. 
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11. Conclusions 
The primary aim of this analysis was to identify the determining factors on the public debt, by estimating an 
econometric model which would explain the public debt / GPD ratio.  
The most important result regards the demographic variables, such as population over 65 , population 
density and population growth. These seem to have more impact on the public debt / GDP ratio than the 
other macroeconomic variables analysed. The only economic variables which emerged as being significant 
in  explaining  the  public  debt  /  GDP  ratio  over  time  seemed  to  be  the  GDP  growth  rate  and  public 
expenditure.  
In  previous  studies  these  variables  (foreign  direct  investments,  inflation  and  balance  of  payments) 
appeared to have an impact on the public debt / GDP ratio, but in our analysis , this seemed not to be the 
case.  
Having ascertained that the population structure had a fundamental role in the public debt / GDP ratio in 
our range time, the per capita public debt / GDP ratio was considered as the dependent variable. No great 
differences were however obtained. Another analysis carried out aimed at improving the model: models 
considered trends, adding dummy variables, but obtained no significant variations.  
These above-mentioned results, which do not seem to confirm the main studies on public debt, may be due 
to the range time analysed. Our range time starts in the years when the Euro was being introduced and 
ends in those immediately prior to the global crisis of 2008.  
Another objective of our thesis was that of highlighting how different estimation results can be obtained by 
using different estimation methods. From our analysis, the strong influence that the different estimation 
methods have on the results clearly emerged.  
Differences between the various estimation methods in simple regressions were visible. In particular there 
are  substantial  differences  between  the  results  obtained  with  the  POLS  method  and  the  FE  and  RE 
methods. There are some variables where the single coefficients estimated with the POLS model seem to 
have a negative effect on the public debt / GDP ratio, whereas a positive effect is achieved when estimating 
with FE and RE. These differences are explained by the biased estimates obtained by using POLS.  
Similar differences were noted in multiple regressions.  
Lastly, we observed the differences between the results obtained from both the simple and the multiple 
regressions. We discovered that in the simple regressions some variables had a negative impact on the 
public debt / GDP ratio, but in the multiple regressions had a positive one, or vice versa. 
For more details on these differences, see section “Comments on the results”.  
At the end of our analysis we can therefore state that the  different estimation methods used greatly 
influence the estimation results.  
Our final model obtained from the multiple regression with FE methods state that an increase on the 
population  over  65  years  old,  public  expenditure  and  GDP  growth  ratio  seems  to  increase  the  public 
debt/GDP ratio. Instead, an increase on the population density and population growth seems to decrease 
the public debt / GDP ratio.  86 
 
As state before we tried to realize other different regressions in order to obtain a better model. It could be 
interesting to run some regressions with an autoregressive model to understand how the results could 
change, as was done by Sinha et al. (2011). 
Lastly, data sensitivity emerged. For more details see “Appendix”.  
Adding or deleting single countries and/or years sometimes has strong effects on the main results. Thus, all 
the results of this thesis and similar papers have to be taken with caution. 
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Appendix 
In order to understand how the results changed with the inclusion of one country as opposed to another 
one or with a different range time we made the following sensitivity analysis of data,  running various 
regressions. 
At first we ran regression with two different datasets. One dataset contains values for all the 19 countries 
considered, for the years 1999 to 2008. The other one contains values for 18 countries (without Greece) for 
the whole time range (1993-2008). If the results of these regressions are mutually identical, we will state 
that whether to include the values for Greece in our dataset or not is not a crucial question, as set out 
below. 
MODEL WITH DATASET FROM 1999 TO 2008 FOR THE 19 COUNTRIES. 
We estimated our first model including all variables from 1999 to 2008, via the normal OLS model: 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     190 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  9,   180) =   31.66 
       Model |  131809.321     9  14645.4802           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  83259.7709   180  462.554283           R-squared     =  0.6129 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5935 
       Total |  215069.092   189  1137.93171           Root MSE      =  21.507 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   8.605045   .7321963    11.75   0.000     7.160253    10.04984 
      popden |   .0790408   .0180366     4.38   0.000     .0434504    .1146313 
   popgrowth |  -1.563786   3.738671    -0.42   0.676    -8.941048    5.813475 
      expend |  -.2362898   .5308581    -0.45   0.657    -1.283795    .8112158 
   fdiinoecd |  -.0501376   .4076097    -0.12   0.902    -.8544456    .7541704 
  fdioutoecd |  -1.358355   .5824969    -2.33   0.021    -2.507756   -.2089545 
curaccbala~d |   -1.01143   .3922788    -2.58   0.011    -1.785486   -.2373731 
     gdpgrow |   1.243748   .8833057     1.41   0.161    -.4992183    2.986714 
   inflation |  -.8761197   .9915802    -0.88   0.378    -2.832736    1.080497 
       _cons |  -82.74268   18.03062    -4.59   0.000    -118.3213    -47.1641 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.1 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with all high income countries with range time 1999-2008. 
 
There are some non-significant variables: population growth, public expenditure, foreign direct investment 
(inflow), GDP growth and inflation.  
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We then checked the output with random effect: 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3892                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.4800                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.4750                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    118.90 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   6.145646   .7589186     8.10   0.000     4.658193    7.633099 
      popden |   .0436237   .0510506     0.85   0.393    -.0564335     .143681 
   popgrowth |  -10.81526   2.317565    -4.67   0.000    -15.35761   -6.272919 
      expend |   1.486112   .7635251     1.95   0.052    -.0103698    2.982594 
   fdiinoecd |   .1886551   .1333312     1.41   0.157    -.0726693    .4499796 
  fdioutoecd |   -.039844   .2222789    -0.18   0.858    -.4755026    .3958145 
curaccbala~d |  -.0058527   .2582497    -0.02   0.982    -.5120129    .5003074 
     gdpgrow |   .8320571   .3602543     2.31   0.021     .1259715    1.538143 
   inflation |   .0372168   .4009477     0.09   0.926    -.7486263    .8230599 
       _cons |  -73.87861   19.25633    -3.84   0.000    -111.6203   -36.13689 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  26.253336 
     sigma_e |  6.5120587 
         rho |  .94203892   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.2 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with all high income countries with range time 1999-2008.RE 
 
The  non-significant  variables  are:  population  density,  public  expenditure,  FDI  investment  (inflow  and 
outflow), balance of payments(current account) and inflation. 
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The third model was estimated using the fixed effect method: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       190 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        19 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4243                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0027                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0017                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(9,162)           =     13.27 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9320                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.262538   .8991022     8.08   0.000     5.487067    9.038009 
      popden |  -.6515275   .2275663    -2.86   0.005    -1.100906   -.2021488 
   popgrowth |  -9.733813   2.341221    -4.16   0.000    -14.35706   -5.110568 
      expend |   2.665998   .8467599     3.15   0.002      .993888    4.338108 
   fdiinoecd |   .1708323    .131241     1.30   0.195    -.0883315     .429996 
  fdioutoecd |   .0399842   .2196386     0.18   0.856    -.3937396    .4737079 
curaccbala~d |  -.2297955   .2787048    -0.82   0.411    -.7801583    .3205674 
     gdpgrow |   .8048876   .3624146     2.22   0.028     .0892217    1.520553 
   inflation |   .3004342    .403143     0.75   0.457    -.4956587    1.096527 
       _cons |  -20.07748   26.90006    -0.75   0.457    -73.19745     33.0425 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   93.77147 
     sigma_e |  6.5120587 
         rho |  .99520039   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(18, 162) =   100.08             Prob > F = 0.0000 
Table 11.3 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with all high income countries with range time 1999-2008.FE 
 
 
The non-significant variables are: FDI(inflow and outflow), balance of payments  and inflation. 
MODEL WITH DATASET FROM 1993 TO 2008, WITHOUT GREECE.  
 
The first model we checked was, as usual, via OLS: 
. reg debt pop65 popden popgrowth expend fdiin fdiout curaccoecd gdpgrow inflation 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     288 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  9,   278) =   29.24 
       Model |  126342.959     9  14038.1066           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  133459.754   278  480.071056           R-squared     =  0.4863 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4697 
       Total |  259802.713   287  905.235934           Root MSE      =  21.911 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.854413    .639811    12.28   0.000     6.594923    9.113902 
      popden |     .06066   .0144588     4.20   0.000     .0321972    .0891227 
   popgrowth |   2.771964   3.374758     0.82   0.412    -3.871363     9.41529 
      expend |   .6673709   .4194888     1.59   0.113    -.1584071    1.493149 
   fdiinoecd |  -.1603494   .3802093    -0.42   0.674    -.9088043    .5881055 
  fdioutoecd |  -2.291238    .544076    -4.21   0.000     -3.36227   -1.220206 
  curaccoecd |   .4204936   .3182111     1.32   0.187    -.2059158    1.046903 
     gdpgrow |    1.86807   .6485186     2.88   0.004     .5914393    3.144701 
   inflation |   .7252762   .3028295     2.39   0.017     .1291461    1.321406 
       _cons |   -89.2286   13.91897    -6.41   0.000    -116.6286   -61.82864 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.4 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with 18 high income countries (without Greece) with range 
time 1993-2008. 
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The  non-significant  variables  are:  population  growth,  public  expenditure,  FDI  (inflow)  and  balance  of 
payments. 
 
The second model estimated with this dataset is with the random effect approach:  
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       288 
Group variable: var2                            Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5359                         Obs per group: min =        16 
       between = 0.2912                                        avg =      16.0 
       overall = 0.3151                                        max =        16 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    297.87 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.086101   .6756472    10.49   0.000     5.761857    8.410346 
      popden |   .0028865    .049103     0.06   0.953    -.0933535    .0991266 
   popgrowth |  -16.14376   2.386523    -6.76   0.000    -20.82126   -11.46626 
      expend |   3.280234   .6198379     5.29   0.000     2.065374    4.495094 
   fdiinoecd |   .0387713    .183083     0.21   0.832    -.3200647    .3976073 
  fdioutoecd |  -.8790706   .2875412    -3.06   0.002    -1.442641   -.3155003 
  curaccoecd |   .1037255   .2661989     0.39   0.697    -.4180147    .6254658 
     gdpgrow |   1.667625   .3308997     5.04   0.000     1.019074    2.316177 
   inflation |   .9751063   .1870067     5.21   0.000     .6085799    1.341633 
       _cons |  -115.5351   15.45021    -7.48   0.000     -145.817   -85.25328 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  24.798816 
     sigma_e |  9.5062484 
         rho |  .87188097   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.5 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with 18 high income countries (without Greece) with range 
time 1993-2008.RE 
 
Here the non-significant variables are: population density, FDI (inflow) and balance of payments. 
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The last model is with the fixed effect method: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       288 
Group variable: var2                            Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5759                         Obs per group: min =        16 
       between = 0.0022                                        avg =      16.0 
       overall = 0.0066                                        max =        16 
 
                                                F(9,261)           =     39.37 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9545                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   8.855702   .7446631    11.89   0.000      7.38939    10.32201 
      popden |  -.6708006   .1378655    -4.87   0.000    -.9422708   -.3993303 
   popgrowth |  -16.78474   2.308272    -7.27   0.000    -21.32995   -12.23954 
      expend |   4.272984   .6313298     6.77   0.000     3.029835    5.516132 
   fdiinoecd |     .06088   .1747967     0.35   0.728    -.2833114    .4050713 
  fdioutoecd |  -.6305231   .2776676    -2.27   0.024    -1.177277   -.0837693 
  curaccoecd |  -.0045214   .2601649    -0.02   0.986    -.5168107    .5077679 
     gdpgrow |   1.526482   .3185929     4.79   0.000     .8991421    2.153821 
   inflation |   1.078031   .1816887     5.93   0.000     .7202686    1.435793 
       _cons |   -67.7684   17.64309    -3.84   0.000    -102.5093   -33.02748 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   98.50813 
     sigma_e |  9.5062484 
         rho |  .99077326   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(17, 261) =    71.52             Prob > F = 0.0000 
Table 11.6 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with 18 high income countries (without Greece) with range 
time 1993-2008. FE 
 
The non-significant variables are: FDI(inflow) and balance of payments. 
To show the output differences between the two datasets more clearly and to resume the differences 
between the results obtained, we made the following table: 
 
 
with Greece from 1999 to 2008  without Greece from 1993 to 2008 
 
total effect  fixed effect   random effect  total effect   fixed effect   random effect 
population over 65   +  +  +  +  +  + 
population density  +  -  (n) +  +  -  (n) + 
population growth  (n) -  -  -  (n) +  -  - 
public expenditure  (n) -  +  (n) +  (n) +  +  + 
FDI in  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  (n) -  (n) +  (n) + 
FDI out  -  (n) +  (n) -  -  -  - 
current account   -  (n) -  (n) -  (n) +  (n) -  (n) + 
GDP growth  (n) +  +  +  +  +  + 
inflation  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  +  +  + 
Table 11.7 It shows differences in significance term between two different dataset: 1)with Greece from 1999 to 2008, 2) without 
  Greece from 1993 to 2008.   
It is possible to see some differences. We are interested in knowing whether these differences are caused 
by the presence of Greece or not, or whether they are due to the different range time considered in the 
datasets.  
In order to discover this fact we acted as below. 
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We  ran  some  more  regressions  without  Greece  in  the  same  time  range  (1999-2008)  in  which  it  was 
included before. 
 
With the total effect method we have the following output: 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     180 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  9,   170) =   27.40 
       Model |  105784.257     9  11753.8063           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |    72934.04   170  429.023765           R-squared     =  0.5919 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5703 
       Total |  178718.297   179  998.426238           Root MSE      =  20.713 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.445852   .7520961     9.90   0.000     5.961202    8.930502 
      popden |   .0920245   .0176012     5.23   0.000     .0572794    .1267697 
   popgrowth |  -.0217241   3.617357    -0.01   0.995    -7.162447    7.118999 
      expend |    .264858   .5234747     0.51   0.614    -.7684898    1.298206 
   fdiinoecd |   .2518903   .3984782     0.63   0.528    -.5347122    1.038493 
  fdioutoecd |  -1.191634   .5652491    -2.11   0.036    -2.307445   -.0758227 
  curaccoecd |  -.7090495   .3936608    -1.80   0.073    -1.486142    .0680436 
     gdpgrow |   .3103384   .8937049     0.35   0.729     -1.45385    2.074527 
   inflation |  -1.008794   .9593352    -1.05   0.294    -2.902537    .8849502 
       _cons |  -77.48484   17.50581    -4.43   0.000    -112.0416   -42.92807 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.8 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with 18 high income countries (without Greece) with range 
time 1999-2008. 
 
We ran the second regression with this dataset with the random effect method: 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       180 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4006                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.4941                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.4877                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(9)       =    116.92 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   6.346665   .8147065     7.79   0.000      4.74987    7.943461 
      popden |   .0509877   .0525967     0.97   0.332       -.0521    .1540753 
   popgrowth |  -10.83357   2.352358    -4.61   0.000     -15.4441    -6.22303 
      expend |    1.50686   .8358231     1.80   0.071    -.1313232    3.145043 
   fdiinoecd |   .1884409   .1347934     1.40   0.162    -.0757493     .452631 
  fdioutoecd |  -.0386686   .2249192    -0.17   0.863    -.4795023     .402165 
  curaccoecd |  -.0676804   .2932052    -0.23   0.817    -.6423519    .5069911 
     gdpgrow |   .9065053   .3810392     2.38   0.017     .1596822    1.653329 
   inflation |   .0652651    .408324     0.16   0.873    -.7350353    .8655655 
       _cons |  -81.00369   20.22327    -4.01   0.000    -120.6406    -41.3668 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   26.83834 
     sigma_e |  6.5771066 
         rho |  .94334613   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.9 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with 18 high income countries (without Greece) with range 
time 1999-2008.RE  
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In the end, the output by regression with the fixed effect method: 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       180 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4431                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.0208                                        avg =      10.0 
       overall = 0.0167                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(9,153)           =     13.53 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9565                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        debt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       pop65 |   7.957795   .9831314     8.09   0.000      6.01553     9.90006 
      popden |   -.745611   .2370146    -3.15   0.002    -1.213855   -.2773674 
   popgrowth |  -9.936394   2.370342    -4.19   0.000    -14.61922   -5.253569 
      expend |   2.657005   .9260648     2.87   0.005     .8274799    4.486529 
   fdiinoecd |   .1620829   .1327195     1.22   0.224    -.1001165    .4242824 
  fdioutoecd |   .0428834    .222509     0.19   0.847    -.3967032      .48247 
  curaccoecd |   -.449957   .3240979    -1.39   0.167    -1.090242    .1903277 
     gdpgrow |   .8530571   .3867533     2.21   0.029      .088991    1.617123 
   inflation |   .3681982   .4115043     0.89   0.372    -.4447657    1.181162 
       _cons |  -17.78341   28.64383    -0.62   0.536    -74.37189    38.80508 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  108.17193 
     sigma_e |  6.5771066 
         rho |  .99631669   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(17, 153) =    90.18             Prob > F = 0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 11.10 Output of the multifactor regression on public debt / GDP with 18 high income countries (without Greece) with range 
time 1999-2008.FE 
 
 
Taking the left part of the last table, we compared it with the new results: 
 
with greece from 1999 to 2008  without greece from 1999 to 2008 
 
total effect  fixed effect   random effect  total effect   fixed effect   random effect 
population growth  +  +  +  +  +  + 
population density  +  -  (n) +  +  -  (n) + 
population over 65  (n) -  -  -  (n) -  -  - 
public expenditure  (n) -  +  (n) +  (n) +  +  (n) + 
FDI in  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  (n) +  (n) +  (n) + 
FDI out  -  (n) +  (n) -  -  (n) +  (n) - 
current account   -  (n) -  (n) -  (n) -  (n) -  (n) - 
GDP growth  (n) +  +  +  (n) +  +  + 
inflation  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  (n) -  (n) +  (n) + 
Table 11.11 It shows differences in significance term between two different dataset: 1)with Greece from 1999 to 2008, 2) without 
  Greece from 1999 to 2008.   
It is possible to see that there are no substantial differences between the results obtained in the two sets 
above. This seems to imply that including Greece or not may be irrelevant, but the range time seems to be 
relevant.  
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In order to confirm this we compare the results obtained from the regressions without Greece in two 
different range times 
 
without greece from 1993 to 2008  without greece from 1999 to 2008 
 
total effect  fixed effect   random effect  total effect   fixed effect   random effect 
population growth  +  +  +  +  +  + 
population density  +  -  (n) +  +  -  (n) + 
population over 65  (n) +  -  -  (n) -  -  - 
public expenditure  (n) +  +  +  (n) +  +  (n) + 
FDI in  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  (n) +  (n) +  (n) + 
FDI out  -  -  -  -  (n) +  (n) - 
current account   (n) +  (n) -  (n) +  (n) -  (n) -  (n) - 
GDP growth  +  +  +  (n) +  +  + 
inflation  +  +  +  (n) -  (n) +  (n) + 
Table 11.12 It shows differences between two different dataset: 1)without Greece from 1999 to 2008, 2) without Greece from 1999 
to 2008.   
Observing table 11.12 we can state that the adding or the deleting of some years has effects on the results. 
In order to understand whether  this can also be stated for the inclusion or exclusion of some countries, we 
run some regressions removing countries from the dataset one by one. We discovered that the inclusion or 
the exclusion of countries may considerably alter the results. (see table 11.13). 
 
with all 19 countries from 1999 to 2008  without Hungary from 1999 to 2008 
 
total effect  fixed effect   random effect  total effect   fixed effect   random effect 
population growth  +  +  +  +  +  + 
population density  +  -  (n) +  +  -  (n) + 
population over 65  (n) -  -  -  (n) -  -  - 
public expenditure  (n) -  +  (n) +  (n) -  +  + 
FDI in  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  (n) -  (n) +  (n) + 
FDI out  -  (n) +  (n) -  -  (n) +  (n) - 
current account   -  (n) -  (n) -  -  (n) -  (n) + 
GDP growth  (n) +  +  +  (n) +  +  + 
inflation  (n) -  (n) +  (n) +  (n) -  (n) +  (n) + 
Table 11.13 It shows differences in significance term between two different dataset: 1)with Hungary from 1999 to 2008, 2) without 
  Hungary from 1993 to 2008. 
From the previous analysis it emerges that both including or excluding countries and a variation in the 
range time considered change the results. 
Finally, our choice is to analyse all the countries for the time period 1999-2008, so as to avoid having the 
presence of the anomalous behaviour  that the countries wishing to adopt  the Euro showed from 1995 to 
1998. 
 
 